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ABSTRACT
Three Essays On “Production and Technical Efficiency”
Douglas Mugabe
This dissertation examines production and or technical efficiencies in agricultural and energy
systems. First, I focus on the agriculture system, looking at corn production, which is not only
grown for food but also an important renewable energy source. Second, I examine
efficiency and inter-fuel substitution in the production of electricity. Lastly, I examine the role
of drilled but uncompleted wells in natural gas production.
The first essay examines production capabilities of smallholder corn farmers following Zimbabwe’s
fast track land reform program of 2000. This paper accounts for various production frontiers
to provide more reliable efficiency estimates than can be obtained using traditional parametric
methods. I also use a semi-parametric model, which allows for flexible production function and
assumes that exogenous variables directly affect output. I find that observed production
shortfalls can be significantly mitigated by implementing appropriate government programs that
focus on gender, age, extension services and inclusion of other crops.
The second essay examines efficiency and state level fuel substitution in the US electricity
generation sector. Previous studies used aggregate data to evaluate fuel substitutability
implicitly assuming uniformity of policy implications across regions. This can produce biased
estimates of policy effects at the (sub)regional levels, which can potentially lead to suboptimal
policy recommendations. Understanding spatial variations in inter-fuel substitution patterns
across states is important for effective policy design as the response of power producers to
policies differs depending on technological endowments, fuel availability, environmental

regulation, and institutional contexts. I apply the recent fixed effects stochastic frontier estimation
to understand the implications of changes in inter-fuel substitution for technical efficiency.
Findings demonstrate that regional fossil-fuel utilization in electricity generation depends on fuel
substitution and the capability of power producers to respond to fuel price changes. These findings
illustrate the need for careful regional analysis and design of electricity policies, especially given
anticipated retirements of power generation units. I also find that increase in substitution capabilities
has positive effects on efficiency and reduction of CO2 emissions.
The third essay examines the role of drilled but uncompleted wells (DUCs) in the US natural gas
production. Prior studies have used drilling rig activity (measured by rig count) as a major predictor
of oil and gas production. However, in the last decade, correlation between production and drilling
rig activity weakened, raising doubts about the suitability of rig count as the major driver. This study
considers variations in producing, newly completed and drilled but uncompleted wells to understand
the current production of natural gas. The results show a significant relationship between well
completion and natural gas output, but the strength of the relationship differs across US regions.
The weakening of the relationship between drilling rig activity and natural gas production is due
to the increase in the number of drilled but uncompleted wells, which in turn depends on natural gas
prices and pipeline capacity. Among other variables examined, oil and gas prices, pipeline capacity
and well length significantly determine the length of time taken to complete drilled wells.

iv
DEDICATION
I would like to dedicate my dissertation to my family: my lovely and supporting wife, Itai Lorraine; my
beautiful princesses Kelsy Ruvarashe and Kacey Ruvimbo and handsome prince Douglas Kayden Jr.
I would also like to dedicate my research to my caring parents: my mother Mrs. Bessie Mugabe and
my father, the late Mr. Caiphas Mugabe and my humble inlaws Mrs Flora Jaure and the late, Mr.
Casper Jaure.
I am forever grateful for the support from my siblings (Titus, Partson, Sekai, Anold, Last, Bridget and
the late Passmore) and their respective spouses.

v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents

Page

ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................................... ii
DEDICATION .............................................................................................................................. iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................v
LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................................... vii
LIST OF TABLES........................................................................................................................ viii
NOMENCLATURE ...................................................................................................................... ix
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...............................................................................................................x
CHAPTER 1. How efficient is maize production among smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe? A
comparison of semiparametric and parametric frontier efficiency analyses. .......................................1
Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 2
1.2 Methods ................................................................................................................................ 7
1.2.1. Parametric Stochastic Production Frontier Model ........................................................ 7
1.2.2. Stochastic Frontier with a Generalized Additive Model (GAM).................................... 9
1.2.3. Allowing Contextual Variables under the GAM Framework-GAMLSS Model ........... 10
1.3 Data .................................................................................................................................... 13
1.4 Results ................................................................................................................................ 17
1.4.1. Results for A1 Sub-Sample ......................................................................................... 18
1.4.2. Full Sample Analysis using both A1 and A2 Households ............................................ 23
1.5 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 27
REFERENCES ..............................................................................................................................30
CHAPTER 2. Elasticity of Substitution and Technical Efficiency: Evidence from US Electricity
Generation. .....................................................................................................................................35
Abstract .................................................................................................................................... 35
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 36
2.2 Methodology ....................................................................................................................... 40
2.2.1. Inter-fuel Substitution ................................................................................................ 40
2.2.2. Technical Efficiency Analysis ..................................................................................... 43
2.2.3. Inter-Fossil Fuel Substitution and CO2 Emissions ...................................................... 46
2.3 Data .................................................................................................................................... 47
2.4 Results ................................................................................................................................ 48
2.4.1. Variation in Fossil Fuel Mix in Electricity Generation ................................................ 48
2.4.2. Fossil Fuel Substitution .............................................................................................. 49

vi
2.4.3. Stochastic Frontier Analysis ....................................................................................... 52
2.4.4. Fossil Fuel Substitution and CO2 Emissions ............................................................... 55
2.5 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 56
REFERENCES ..............................................................................................................................59
APPENDIX ...................................................................................................................................68
CHAPTER 3. All the DUCs in a Row: Natural Gas Production in the US. .....................................72
Abstract .................................................................................................................................... 72
3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 73
3.2 Data .................................................................................................................................... 78
3.3 Empirical Strategy ............................................................................................................... 82
3.3.1. Natural gas production ............................................................................................... 83
3.3.2. DUC Counts .............................................................................................................. 84
3.3.3. DUC Status Duration ................................................................................................. 84
3.4 Results ................................................................................................................................ 85
3.4.1. Determinants of Natural Gas Production (NGP) ....................................................... 86
3.4.2. DUCs Analysis ........................................................................................................... 90
3.4.3. DUC Status Duration Analysis ................................................................................... 92
3.5 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 95
REFERENCES ..............................................................................................................................99
APPENDIX .................................................................................................................................106

vii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figures

Page

Figure 1: Gradients (output elasticities) estimated by the semiparametric model for various input levels. ................ 19
Figure 2. Elasticities of scale and relationship with farm size obtained by the semiparametric model. ................... 20
Figure 3. Efficiency score for the two model competitors for A1 farmers: parametric (SFA-BC) and
semiparametric (SFA-GAMLSS). .................................................................................. 22
Figure 4. Output elasticities and elasticities of scale from semiparametric models. ............................................. 25
Figure 5. Efficiency estimated by semiparametric and parametric models against log(output). .............................. 26
Figure 6. Fuel use for electricity production in the US (Million BTUs) ........................................................ 39
Figure 7: US rig activity and natural gas production ................................................................................. 74
Figure 8. Rig count, drilled and un-completed well count, and natural gas production trends from 2007-2018 ...... 76
Figure 9: Kaplan-Meier survival curves................................................................................................... 92

viii
LIST OF TABLES
Tables

Page

Table 1 Summary Statistics of Data for Maize Production Efficiency Analysis. .............................. 15
Table 2. Stochastic Frontier Model Estimation Results for A1 Farm Households. ......................... 18
Table 3. Estimation Results for A1 and A2 Farm Households........................................................ 24
Table 4. State and Time Fixed Effect Regression Results for Fossil Fuel Shares in Electricity
Generation................................................................................................................. 49
Table 5: Fossil Fuel Substitution Elasticities ................................................................................... 50
Table 6: Price Elasticities ................................................................................................................ 51
Table 7: Stochastic Frontier Estimation Results (TFE –MLE; Green 2005) ................................... 53
Table 8: State and Time Fixed Effects Regression Results for CO2 Emissions ................................ 56
Table 9. Descriptive Statistics ......................................................................................................... 80
Table 10: Split Sample Regional Fixed Effects Results for Aggregate NGP .................................... 85
Table 11: Region and Time Fixed Effects Regression Results for Aggregate NGP ......................... 86
Table 12: Regional Regression Results (Determinants of NGP) ..................................................... 87
Table 13: Regional and Time Fixed Effects Regression Results (NGP and New Wells) .................. 88
Table 14: Drilled and Un-Completed Well Analysis Regional Regression Results ........................... 91
Table 15: OLS Log-log Regression Results for DUC Well Analysis per Region .............................. 91
Table 16: DUC Duration Analysis Results ...................................................................................... 94

ix
NOMENCLATURE
Bcf
BTU
CO2
DFA
DI
DUC
EIA
EPA
FAO
FTLRP
GAM
GAMLSS
GW
LRT
Mcf
MMSLE
NYMEX
OLS
RPS
SEDS
SEMSFA
SF
TFE-MLE
UOG
US
USDA
US-EPA
VAR
VEC
WMLE

Billion Cubic Feet
British Thermal Units
Carbon Dioxide
Deterministic Frontier Analysis
DrillingInfo
Drilled but Un-Completed Well
Energy Information Administration
Energy Policy Act
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Fast Track Land Reform Programme
Generalized Additive Model
Generalized Additive Models for Location, Scale and Shape
Gigawatt
Likelihood Ratio Test
Thousand Cubic Feet
Marginalized Maximum Simulated Likelihood Estimation
New York Mercantile Exchange
Ordinary Least Squares
Renewable Portfolio Standards
State Energy Data System
Semiparametric Estimation of Stochastic Frontier Models
Stochastic Frontier
True Fixed Effects Regression Through Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Unconventional Oil and Gas
United States
United States Department of Agriculture
United States-Environmental Protection Agency
Vector Auto Regression
Vector Error Correction
Within-Maximum Likelihood Estimation

x
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
My advisor, Dr. Levan Elbakidze, gave me the necessary guidance and constant support throughout
my research. I am very thankful for his advice, suggestions, direction, encouragement and wise
counsel.
Dr. Xiaoli L. Etienne provided constant support and guidance especially during my first essay. She
provided opportunities which were the foundation of my research.
Dr. Gulnara R. Zaynutdinova, provided great insights. I am privileged to have her as part of my PhD
committee.
Dr. Peter V. Schaeffer has been supportive throughout this endeavor. He is a great man, always
approachable and willing to listen.
Dr. Giancarlo Ferrara and Dr. Tim Carr have been resourceful in my first paper and last paper
respectively. Their advice and knowledge enhanced my research.
Dr. Alan Collins and Dr. Gerard D'souza, gave me advice and support since I started my PhD
program.
To all faculty, staff and fellow graduate students from Division of Resource Economics and
Management (REM), Department of Economics (BUE) and Regional Research Institute (RRI), I am
grateful for the opportunity to work with you.
I would also like to acknowledge the funding support from Fulbright Foreign Student Program and
WVU, REM and RRI towards the completion of my PhD studies.
To the Almighty God, who make all things possible, may your name be exalted.

1
CHAPTER 1. How efficient is maize production among smallholder farmers in
Zimbabwe? A comparison of semiparametric and parametric frontier efficiency analyses.
Abstract
The controversial Fast Track Land Reform Programme in Zimbabwe
that redistributes commercially owned farmland to smallholder households has
caused concerns about the efficiency of agricultural production in the country.
In this paper, I estimate the efficiency of resource use among smallholder
farmers in Zimbabwe when producing maize, the staple crop in the country.
Using both a semiparametric model and a fully parametric stochastic frontier
model, I find significant production shortfalls for smallholder maize
production. While labor, capital, and land all significantly affect the total
output, the estimated mean efficiency score for farms with less than 10
hectares of land(A1) appears to be under 0.75, and for the entire sample (A1
and A2) it ranges between 0.595 and 0.772. There clearly exists a great potential
for maize farmers to improve the technical efficiency and increase the total
output. Gender and age of the household head, access to extension services,
and activities for other crops significantly affect the technical efficiency of
smallholder maize production in Zimbabwe. I also find that all farms operate
under increasing returns to scale and that the technical efficiency score tends
to increase with the level of output.

Keywords: Stochastic frontier; maize production; Zimbabwe; Fast Track
Land Reform Programme; contextual variables; semi-parametric model
JEL CLASSIFICATION: Q12; C14; N57
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1.1 Introduction
Agricultural production is one of the primary economic sectors in Zimbabwe and represents
the livelihood of most of the poor in the country. However, one of the key inputs to its agricultural
production, land, had been largely occupied by large-scale commercial farms prior to Zimbabwe’s
independence in 19801. Since the 1980s, the Zimbabwean government has been actively pursuing
land reform and resettlement policies that aim to reverse the racially skewed agricultural landownership pattern. In 2000, the government started the Fast Track Land Reform Programme
(FTLRP), targeting to acquire at least five million hectares of landpreviously owned by large
commercial farmers for redistribution. Under the FTLRP, A1 and A2 farm models were created,
replacing large commercial farmers with rural communal farmers2. A1 model farms are small plots
usually with less than 10 hectares of arable land allocated to farmers, while A2 model includes farms
with plots typically above 10 hectares grouped into small, medium and large farms (Cliffe et al. 2013).
Currently, more than 35 percent of arable land in Zimbabwe has been reallocated to smallholder
farmers among 161,500 families since the implementation of the FTLRP, resulting in 145,000 A1 and
16,500 A2 farmers (Pallotti and Tornimbeni 2015; Scoones et al. 2011).
Traditionally, smallholder farmers are characterized with little or no investment in agricultural
production due to limited access to agricultural input and output markets, insecurity in land tenure
systems, opportunities in off-farm employment and imperfection in local agricultural and credit
markets. As a result, some market analysts and researchers have argued that the efficiency of
agricultural production in Zimbabwe has deteriorated after the FTLRP, which essentially replaced
efficiently-run commercial farms with smallholder farms lacking the ability to optimally utilize the
1Shaw

(2003) reports that 45 percent of agricultural land in Zimbabwe was occupied by less than 1 percent of the
population in 1980.
2Currently, Zimbabwe’s land ownership falls into four categories: communal, old resettlement, A1, and small-scale
commercial and A2. USDA (2018) reports that in 2018, A1 and A2 farmers produced about 26% and 31% of the country’s
maize, respectively.
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available resources (Cliffe et al. 2013; Davies 2005; Moyo 2004; Zikhali 2010). Indeed, Zikhali (2010)
evaluated the impact of FTLRP on agricultural production in Zimbabwe and found that beneficiaries
of the program were reluctant to invest in soil conservation due to a lack of tenure security, adversely
affecting crop production in the country.3
A handful of empirical studies have evaluated the technical efficiency of agricultural
production in Zimbabwe after the implementation of the FTLRP. Bangwayo-Skeete, Bezabih, and
Zikhali (2010) estimated that beneficiaries of the FTLRP in Mashonaland Central province had an
average of only 37.3% production efficiency (i.e., the total output relative to the potential output
possible based on available resources), though this number is considerably higher than communal
farmers that applied for the program but were rejected. Obi and Chisango (2011) analyzed the
performance of resettled smallholder farmers under limited mechanization and the FTLRP, finding a
high degree of inefficiencies in resource use in the smallholder system. Richardson (2004) reported
that agricultural production in Zimbabwe encountered a 30% drop in 2004 after the FTLRP was
implemented. Chitiga and Mabugu (2008), on the other hand, found that the output of some
agricultural commodities (i.e., grains, beans, vegetables, livestock, and forestry) would experience a
modest increase under the FTLRP if the reform is well managed using a computable general
equilibrium model.
With a few exceptions (e.g., Carberry et al. 2013; Ndlovu et al. 2014; Mango et al. 2015), only
limited attention has been paid to the technical efficiency of maize production in Zimbabwe after the
FLRTP. Maize is the staple crop in Zimbabwe and is used for both household consumption and
income generation. In recent years, maize production in Zimbabwe has steadily declined. Data from

3For

instance, the offer letter given to the A1 farmers explicitly states that the government may withdraw the offer at any
time without compensating the farmers for any improvements they made on the land; this provision could disincentive
A1 farmers from making investment on the land (Matondi 2012).
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the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO 2018) suggest that Zimbabwe was a net exporter of
maize prior to 2001, with the average annual net export exceeding 250 thousand tons in 1961–2001
but has been a net importer since.4 In 2016, Zimbabwe imported over 800 thousand tons of maize,
an amount almost equal to its total domestic production (FAO 2018). Like other agricultural
commodities, one possible contributor to Zimbabwe’s maize output decline is the 2000 FTLRP, which
has resulted in a significant number of smallholder farms lacking the skills and ability to efficiently
produce agricultural commodities compared to the previously large-scale commercial farms.
Among papers that focused on maize in Zimbabwe, Ndlovu et al. (2014) compared the
efficiency of maize production under conservation versus conventional agriculture, finding that
though the farmers in conservation agriculture showed significantly higher yield due to technical
progress, there is no statistical difference in the technical efficiency of maize production between the
two types of farmers. Carberry et al. (2013) use crop simulation models to determine shortfalls from
the maximum attainable yield based on existing levels of agricultural inputs, finding that only 28% of
the maize farmers had a technical efficiency over 0.8, and only 45% had an efficiency score over 0.5.
Mango et al. (2015), a study closely related to the present paper, estimated that the average efficiency
of smallholder maize farmers in Zimbabwe could be improved by 35% if the existing resources and
technology are better used. With regard to the factors considered, they found that the gender of the
household head, household size, frequency of extension visits, farm size and farm region significantly
affected technical efficiency.
The objective of this paper is to contribute to the discussion on the technical efficiency of
smallholder maize farming in Zimbabwe after the FTLRP. In particular, I aim to address the following

4Data

from the World Bank (2018) and other sources suggest similar patterns for Zimbabwe’s maize imports and
exports.
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questions: 1) are land, labor and capital significant in explaining maize production among smallholder
farmers; 2) are smallholder farmers efficiently producing maize and if not, how much more output
can be achieved with available resources; 3) what are the determinants of technical efficiency in maize
production among smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe? Despite the work by Mango et al. (2015) and
others, information on maize production efficiency in Zimbabwe, especially after the implementation
of FTLRP, remains limited. Given the importance of maize in the country’s agricultural sector and
the overall economy, answering these questions could provide additional information to decision
makers in both the government and international agencies interested in designing programs to increase
the country’s maize output, enhance farm household income, improve food security, and reduce
poverty. Additionally, results from the paper have broad implications beyond maize production in
Zimbabwe as similar questions are likely to exist in other agricultural sectors, as well as in many lessdeveloped countries. Similar views are discussed in Mango et al. (2015) on the importance of additional
empirical research in the technical efficiency of smallholder system after the FTLRP.
In the following analysis, I employ a recently developed semiparametric model, as well as the
conventional fully parametric stochastic frontier model to evaluate how far maize production of
smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe deviates from the efficiency frontier. To identify the determinants
of technical (in)efficiency, I further allow both models to depend on household characteristics and
other factors related to maize production. The use of these variables is justified by the underlying
hypothesis of technical efficiency that farmers with the same production technology and resources
may produce different levels of output due to heterogeneous managerial skills. Specific variables used
are determined based on previous literature and data availability, which I defer the discussion to the
data and results sections. Results suggest that smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe are not efficiently
using the available resources when producing maize. While labor, capital, and land all significantly
affect the total output, the estimated mean efficiency score ranges between 0.595 and 0.772 for the
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full sample and falls below 0.75 when only A1 households are used. There clearly exists a great
potential for maize farmers to increase the total output by improving the technical efficiency of
production. I further find that gender and age of the household head, access to extension services,
and activities on other crops significantly affect the technical efficiency of smallholder maize
production.
This paper differs from Mango et al. (2015), which also investigated the technical efficiency of
maize production in Zimbabwe after FTLRP using frontier analysis and cross-sectional data, mostly
on methodological aspects.5 Mango et al. (2015) used the conventional fully-parametric stochastic
frontier model with a Cobb-Douglas production function, which may suffer from model
misspecification as discussed in Giannakas, Tran, and Tzouvelekas (2003). The semi-parametric
approach I adopt, on the other hand, does not impose a specific production technology in the
estimation but selects the most appropriate function based on the data. The two methods also differ
in the way factors contributing to technical inefficiency are accounted for in the analysis. In the
parametric model, these contextual variables are assumed to affect the total output indirectly by
altering the inefficiency term. In the semiparametric model, by contrast, these variables are assumed
to affect the conditional expectation structure of the efficiency frontier. Secondly, Mango et al. (2015)
do not differentiate between the two types of farmers, i.e., A1 and A2, which could display different
technical efficiencies due to heterogeneity in land, capital, and labor inputs. the paper instead accounts
for heterogeneous production frontiers for A1 and A2 farms, potentially providing more reliable
technical efficiency estimates. Moreover, as noted in the data section, the farm households considered
in the analysis present rather different production patterns as compared to those in Mango et al.

5While

Ndlovu et al. (2014) and Carberry et al. (2013) also discuss maize production efficiency in Zimbabwe, the former
focuses on the productivity and efficiency of maize under conservation agriculture, and the latter analyzed the efficiency
of maize farmers using crop simulation models without analyzing the factors contributing to the inefficiency.
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(2015), allowing the paper to provide additional information on the technical efficiency of smallholder
maize production not already covered in the literature.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 1.2 details the two methods
(parametric and semiparametric stochastic frontier models) used for the analysis. Section 1.3 describes
the data, and results are presented in Section 1.4. Concluding remarks and policy suggestions are given
in Section 1.5.

1.2 Methods
In this section I first briefly describe the parametric stochastic frontier model commonly used
for technical efficiency analysis, and then explain in detail the recently developed semiparametric
model that relaxes the assumption of fixed production technology and allows the contextual variables
to affect the efficiency frontier directly.
1.2.1. Parametric Stochastic Production Frontier Model
In a seminal paper, Farrell (1957) introduced a framework to measure production inefficiency
that uses the frontier production function as a benchmark. Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and
Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) independently developed the parametric stochastic frontier
approach so that deviations from the production frontier are a result of both technical inefficiency
and random disturbance. Equation (1.1) shows the parametric stochastic frontier model assuming a
Cobb-Douglas production function:
`

yi = α + xiβ + vi − ui,

i = 1,...,n,

(1.1)

where yi is the output (on log) by unit i, xi is a vector of input variables (on log) and α and β are the
parameters to be estimated. The error term consists of two elements: v measures the idiosyncratic
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disturbance due to measurement errors and represents the classical noise, and u measures a one-sided
disturbance that captures technical inefficiency (ui > 0). The random error term v is assumed to follow
a two-sided normal distribution (i.e., v ∼ iid N(0,σv2)), while u is distributed half-normally on the nonnegative part of the real number line (i.e., ui ∼ iid N+(0,σu2)). The production function f(·), defining the
maximum output that can be achieved given the inputs x, is assumed to be identical for all units i.
To estimate the determinants of technical (in) efficiency, Equation (1.1) is modified to allow
the inefficiency term ui to linearly depend on exogenous (or contextual) variables zi, as in Equation
(1.2):
ui = ziδ + wi,

(1.2)

where δ is a vector of parameters for the determinants of technical inefficiency, w is the truncation of
the N(0,σu2) distribution such that wi > −ziδ, and u is a non-negative truncation of the N(ziδ,σu2)
distribution (Battese and Coelli 1995). This specification takes into account the heterogeneity of each
individual unit by modeling the mean of the inefficiency term as a function of the contextual z
variables. As such, it introduces variables into the model that directly affect production efficiency and
hence indirectly influence each unit’s total output yi (Lensink and Meesters 2014). As also indicated by
Latruffe (2010), these determinants have to be considered in order to generate heterogeneous levels
of performance.
Equations (1.1) and (1.2) are often estimated in one-step by maximum likelihood. While it is
possible to specify different functional forms for f(·) (e.g., translog), the parametric stochastic frontier
model is often criticized for its lack of flexibility in defining the production technology. Giannakas,
Tran, and Tzouvelekas (2003) show that not only the estimated technical efficiency depends on the
choice of functional specification, but that it may be statistically difficult to select the most appropriate
production technology among a set of feasible parametric alternatives. In other words, assuming f(·)
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to belong to a parametric functional family can be too restrictive and sometimes even inappropriate.

1.2.2. Stochastic Frontier with a Generalized Additive Model (GAM)
To overcome the a priori specification of the production technology, Fan, Li, and Weersink
(1996) introduce a two-step pseudo-likelihood procedure to estimate the stochastic frontier model
where the functional form of the frontier is not known and is obtained via kernel regressions.
Specifically, the frontier function can be rewritten as:

f(xi) = E(yi|xi) + ϕ,

(1.3)

where ϕ = σu(2/π)0.5 and E(yi|xi) is the conditional expectation of the output that can be consistently
estimated by any semi or nonparametric method. The problem of correctly specifying f(·) is therefore
equivalent to estimating the conditional expectation of the output E(yi|xi).
Following Fan, Li, and Weersink (1996), Vidoli and Ferrara (2015) further extend this
approach by considering a Generalized Additive Model (GAM) that explains the variability of the
response using an additive function of the inputs as in the corresponding parametric model.
Specifically, under GAM the conditional expectation function in equation (1.3) becomes:

p

E(yi|xi) = ψ0 +Σ ψj(xij)

(1.4)

j=1

where j = 1,2,...,p indicates each input used in the model and the ψ(·)0s are smooth functions
standardized so that E[ψj(xj)] = 0 (Hastie and Tibshirani 1990). By allowing non-linear dependence
between inputs and the output, the GAM specification is likely to improve the overall fit of the model
as compared to the fully parametric specification. Additionally, the model remains fairly

10
straightforward to interpret: the partial response function ψj plays the same role as βj in the parametric
model (Equation (1.1)) since both explain how the prediction of response varies as xj changes.
The nonparametric estimators of the unknown functions ψj in equation (1.4) have onedimensional convergence rates (Stone 1986). Since each additive term is estimated using a univariate
smoother, the estimators are also able to avoid the curse of dimensionality problem commonly present
with non-parametric models. The fitted functions ψj may help to find suitable simple transformations
of the input variables and, where possible, to switch to a parametric specification of the model.
Therefore, the GAM model includes the linear parametric model as a special case where ψj(xj) = βjxj
but is more general and flexible. Furthermore, the gradients of the non-parametric model can be
interpreted as partial output elasticities and their sum as the elasticity of scale, similar to the parametric
model (Henningsen and Kumbhakar 2009).

1.2.3. Allowing Contextual Variables under the GAM Framework-GAMLSS Model
In the parametric analysis, the contextual variables indirectly modify the production process
by affecting the technical inefficiency term ui (equation 1.2). However, as with the production
technology, there is no general rule defining how the contextual variables should enter the
input/output relationship–they could influence the productivity or technical efficiency or both.
Greene (2008) contends that exogenous factors may exert an influence on a producer’s performance
by directly affecting the production function f(·) itself rather than the efficiency term u with which the
production process is operating. The lack of consensus on how exogenous variables should be handled
is evidenced by the variety of approaches employed in the empirical literature (e.g., Johnson and
Kuosmanen (2011), Florens, Simar, and Van Keilegom (2014) and Mastromarco and Simar (2015)).
Ferrara and Vidoli (2017) recently proposed a new approach to include exogenous factors
under the GAM framework by considering the generalized additive models for location, scale and
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shape (GAMLSS) of Rigby and Stasinopoulos (2005). Specifically, a GAMLSS assumes that the
response variable y ∼ D(y;µ,ω,τ,ν) where D ∈ D can be any distribution, either continuous or discrete,
and the four parameters (µ,ω,τ,ν) are the location (mean), scale (standard deviation), skewness (shape)
and kurtosis (shape) of the distribution, respectively. It is also assumed that D may exhibit
heteroskedasticity, i.e., the scale or shape of the distribution of the response may change with
explanatory variables. For stochastic frontier models, since the normality assumption is typically
assumed in the analysis, it is therefore relevant to specify the mean (µ) and scale (ω) of the distribution.
Based on these assumptions, equation (1.1) under the GAM framework that allows for external factors
can be re-written as:

yi = Ψ(xi;zi) + vi − ui,

i = 1,...,n,

(1.5)

where the input variables x specifies the conditional expectation µ and the z variables are used as
additional explanatory variables for the scale of the distribution (ω). Specifically, I assume

µ = η1 = f1(x),

(1.6)

ω = η2 = f2(z).

(1.7)

where f1(·) and f2(·) are generic functions and each parameter of the distributions can be modeled as
linear/nonlinear parametric functions and/or smoothing functions of the explanatory variables (e.g.,
cubic splines, penalized splines, lowess) and/or random disturbances. In essence, this approach
assumes that instead of directly influencing individual technical (in)efficiency, the exogenous variables
affect the total output by modifying the conditional expectation structure of the frontier. It should be
noted that a special case under this specification is that the input variables x and contextual variables
z only linearly affect the total output. The proposed pseudo-likelihood estimators allow flexibility in
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model selection and capability of imposing monotonicity constraints between each input and the
corresponding output. The latter property can be imposed using P-spline (Eilers and Marx 1996) for
the nonparametric modeling of the relevant GAM as illustrated in Bollaerts, Eilers, and Aerts (2006)
and Muggeo and Ferrara (2008).
The GAMLSS model for stochastic frontier analysis in equations (1.5)-(1.7) can be estimated in
two steps6.
• estimating the conditional expectation E(Y |X = x,Z = z) (i.e. the “mean” frontier) via

GAMLSS,
• estimating error term parameters (σv,σu) by pseudo-likelihood estimators of Fan, Li, and Weersink

(1996).
Under the GAMLSS framework, the technical efficiency score of each unit can be estimated by
deriving the conditional distribution of the component u with respect to the compound error ε = v−u
(Jondrow et al. 1982), which may further be written as:

TEi = exp{−uˆi}.

(1.8)

T-tests can be used to determine whether a specific coefficient of the contextual variables is statistically
significant. Additionally, χ2 test or likelihood ratio test (LRT) can be used to compare the change in
global deviance to evaluate the statistical significance of anynonlinear term in the GAMLSS
framework.
Since there is no ‘best’ approach for efficiency analysis in the presence of contextual variables,

6

A detailed description of the estimation procedure is available in Ferrara and Vidoli (2017).
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I will employ both methods, namely the parametric model of Battese and Coelli (1995), which I refer
to as SFA-BC, and the recently-developed semiparametric model of Ferrara and Vidoli (2017), or
SFA-GAMLSS to estimate the technical efficiency of maize production in Zimbabwe.7 The two
models differ in their ability to take into account observable heterogeneity and hence, a comparison
of the two allows us to evaluate the effect of controlling for different kinds of heterogeneity on the
efficiency estimates and check the robustness of the alternative model.

1.3 Data
A survey was conducted in 2014 in three farms (Long Croft, Sweet Valley, and Davaar) in the
Mazowe district of the Mashonaland Central province in Zimbabwe. Located near Harare (the capital
city of Zimbabwe, which is also a gateway to international markets), Mazowe is comprised primarily
of undulating terrain particularly suitable for agricultural production thanks to its largely flat land,
fertile soils, and plentiful rainfall. According to Chiweshe, Chakona, and Helliker (2015), agricultural
production in the region is characterized by highly contested new land tenure arrangements, as well as
a rapid pace of land acquisition/redistribution under various resettlement programs. Wiggins (2016)
reported that under the FTLRP, the population of Mazowe grew rapidly by 22% from 2002 to 2012
due to the influx of farmers resettled on former large-scale commercial farms. Because of its large
agricultural output and heavy influence from government resettlement programs, Mazowe appears to
be an ideal region to evaluate the agricultural production efficiency in Zimbabwe under the FLTRP.8
The three farms surveyed are in the same agricultural geographical typological area in the

7The

parametric and semiparametric models described in this section can be estimated using the R Environment (R: A
language and environment for statistical computing 2017) by exploiting the following packages: frontier (Coelli and
Henningsen 2013), semsfa (Ferrara and Vidoli 2015) and gamlss (Stasinopoulos and Rigby 2007).
8As pointed out by one reviewer, the study focuses on Mazowe district, one of the most productive Maize production
regions in Zimbabwe. The analysis presented here is therefore limited in scope as it cannot represent the full picture of
Maize production in Zimbabwe given the heterogeneity presented across the country.
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Mazowe district. The sample consists of a total of 113 A1 households who owns less than 10 hectares
of land and 63 A2 households that owns more than 10 hectares of land. For both types of farmers,
information collected through questionnaires includes household characteristics, maize output
realized, inputs (land, capital, and labor) used for maize production and access to extension services.
The questionnaire also includes information on the type of other crops grown and the cost to produce
these crops for A1 households.9
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of maize production and household characteristics for
both A1 and A2 farms in the sample. A2 farmers on average allocated a larger land area, used more
capital and devoted more labor for maize production as compared to A1 farmers.10 While A2 farmers
are able to generate a higher per hectare output, the yield difference between the two types of farms
is not statistically significant. Both A1 and A2 farmers in the sample on average produced maize at
over 2,000 kg/hectare, which is remarkably higher than the average maize yield of 930 kg/hectare in
Zimbabwe in 2014 (FAO 2018).11 While the Mazowe district clearly is more productive compared to
the rest of Zimbabwe, its yield remains significantly lower than the average maize yield in Southern
Africa (4,762 kg/hectare) and the world (5,622 kg/hectare) in 2014 (FAO 2018), suggesting much
room for improvement in maize production.
Per-hectare capital and labor used for maize production are again slightly higher for A2 farms.
Under the FTLRP, the government could withdraw the land offer to A1 farms without compensating
the beneficiaries for their capital investment to the land. This provision, however, does not apply to
A2 farms – the government in fact would provide compensation for A2 farms should they decide to

9These

data for A2 farmers were not collected in the survey.
that A1 farmers are typically only equipped with less than 10 hectares of land, while A2 farmers often own over
10 hectares of total land.
11In the subsequent two years the average maize yield in Zimbabwe had further dropped to below 650 kg/hectare FAO
(2018).
10Recall
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withdraw the land offer. This may explain the slightly higher per hectare capital and labor A2 farmers
used for maize production than their A1 counterparts, which further contributes to the higher maize
yield achieved by these farmers.

Table 1. Summary Statistics of Data for Maize Production Efficiency Analysis.
Mean
Std Dev
Mean
Maize
production
Total output (kg)
6,172.16
(3,996.40)
12,128.70
Land used (hectare)
2.92
(1.45)
5.50
Yield (kg/hectare)
2,073.88
(651.27)
2,149.81
Capital used (Z$)
982.82
(614.61)
1,954.65
Capital per hectare (Z$)
353.26
(182.77)
373.08
Labor used (hours)
217.42
(112.61)
431.71
Labor per hectare (hours)
76.19
(21.23)
79.78
Household characteristics
Age of household head
56.34
(12.77)
57.12
Gender of household head
Male
80
46
Female
33
17
Access to extension service
Yes
83
45
No
30
18
Farmland
information
Total farmland area
6.25
(0.98)
% of area for maize
47.00
(22.58)
T-stats are calculated for the difference in mean between A1 and A2 farms.
Signif. codes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Std Dev
(7,552.32)
(2.70)
(586.95)
(1,191.64)
(187.99)
(223.53)
(23.16)
(12.59)

t-stat
−5.78***
−6.96***
−0.79
−6.00***
−0.67
−7.07***
−1.01
−1.17

Maize production in the sample appears to be volatile. As evidenced by columns 3 and 5 of
Table 1, almost all variables associated with maize production have large standard deviations. Since all
farmers covered in the analysis are located in the same agricultural geographical area and the crops
grown are subject to similar weather disturbances and other random shocks, the large differences in
maize production indicate a high degree of heterogeneity among farmers depending on individual farm
household’s ability in utilizing available resources.
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Table 1 shows rather comparable household characteristics for the two types of farmers. Most
of the households are male headed (over 70%) with the average age of the household head above 55
years. Additionally, over 70% of the families have access to extension services, though it does not
imply that these farmers received extension services.12 The last two rows of Table 1 show the total
land area used for other crop production. This information is only available for A1 farms. A variety
of other crops are grown in the region, including soya beans, cotton, sorghum, groundnuts, sugar
beans, sunflower, etc. Some farmland is also set aside for fallow. On average, A1 households in the
sample occupied 6.25 hectares of farmland, of which 47% were used for maize production. The second
most popular crop is soya beans, accounting for 24% of the farmland.
The household characteristics and other crop variables are used as contextual variables to
determine the factors affecting technical (in)efficiency of maize production among smallholder
farmers in Zimbabwe. These variables are selected based on a joint consideration of previous literature
and data availability. Age of the household is often considered affecting agricultural decisions (Chirwa
2007; Langyintuo and Mulugetta 2005; Mango et al. 2015), as older farmers tend to rely more on
experience rather than technology and are sometimes unwilling to accept the newer management
practices. Gender of the household head is also considered to affect agricultural production due to
bias placed on women (Abdulai, Nkegbe, and Donkoh 2013; Alene and Manyong 2008; Mango et al.
2015). Previous literature also suggests that access to extension activities can significantly increase
technical efficiency (Birkhaeuser, Evenson, and Feder 1991; Mango et al. 2015; Owens, Hoddinott,
and Kinsey 2003), and that crop diversification can as well affect shortfalls from the production
frontier (Manjunatha et al. 2013; Solís, Bravo-Ureta, and Quiroga 2009).

12I

also collected the education background of household head. However, there is little variability with the education
variable since most of the household head only received secondary education.
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Compared to Mango et al. (2015), the households in the sample devoted significantly more
land for maize production–the average maize area is 0.892 hectares in their study while here, the
acreage maize area is 2.92 and 5.5 hectares for A1 and A2 farms, respectively. The farmers in the
present paper also had a higher yield (about 2,000 kg/ha) compared to in Mango et al. (2015) (about
1,400 kg/ha). The differences in maize production characteristics in the two studies suggest that the
paper complements the work by Mango et al. (2015), providing further insights into the technical
efficiency of smallholder maize production after the FTLRP in Zimbabwe.

1.4 Results
The two models presented in Section 1.2 are applied to the maize production data I collected.
The quantity of maize produced (y), as well as all inputs (i.e., labor, capital, and land) are converted to
their logarithmic values. I first analyze the technical efficiency of A1 farmers and then estimate the
two models by considering both types of farmers.13 Pooling across the two types of farmers is justified
given the comparable levels of yield, labor and capital investment per hectare and household
characteristics for A1 and A2 farmers as shown in Table 1.
Prior to the estimation, I first test the adequacy of the Cobb-Douglas function as compared
to the corresponding translog specification in the full parametric model (SFA-BC). Results based on
the Wald test (F ¼ 1:30, p ¼ 0:27) and the likelihood ratio test (χ2 ¼ 8:26, p ¼ 0:22) suggest that the
translog specification fails to provide additional information on the relationship between the output
and input variables.14 As a result, I proceed with the more parsimonious Cobb-Douglas specification

13There

are 113 A1 farmers and only 63 A2 households. I find the models perform poorly when applied to A2 farmers
alone, perhaps due to the small sample size.
14Since the translog model nests the Cobb-Douglas specification, I can use the Wald and the likelihood ratio tests to
determine whether the former provides a better fit than the latter, more parsimonious model.
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for the SFA-BC model. The SFA-GAMLSS model is estimated by imposing the monotonicity
constraint for the inputs under the p-splines framework, and likelihood ratio tests (LRT) are used to
evaluate the statistical significance of anynonlinear term.
1.4.1. Results for A1 Sub-Sample
Estimation results using A1 households alone are reported in Table 2. Both models suggest
that all three inputs, namely, land, labor, and capital, are significant in explaining the total output. The
parametric model (SFA-BC) indicates increasing returns to scale as evidenced by the larger than unity
of the sum of the three estimated coefficients (0.483 + 0.552 + 0.128 = 1.163). The elasticity of maize
production is the highest with respect to labor (0.552), followed by land (0.483) and capital (0.128).
Table 2: Stochastic Frontier Model Estimation Results for A1 Farm Households.
SFA-GAMLSS
SFA-BC
Est
SE
Pr(>|z| )
LRT/Est SE
Production function
Intercept
4.639 0.597
0.000***
8.544
0.021
Land
0.483 0.129
0.000***
138.091
Labor
0.552 0.127
0.000***
158.592
Capital
0.128 0.062
0.038**
74.118
Est
SE
Pr(>|z| )
Est
SE
Contextual variables
Intercept
0.331 0.349
0.343
−1.571
0.375
Male
−0.145 0.105
0.168
−0.295
0.156
Age
0.004 0.004
0.302
0.009
0.004
Extension
−0.299 0.140
0.033**
−0.548
0.162
Other crops
−0.002 0.032
0.959
0.093
0.045
Λ
3.404
2.109

Pr(Chi)/Pr(>|t |)
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
Pr(>|t |)
0.000***
0.062*
0.101
0.001***
0.040**

Signif. codes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
For the semiparametric model (SFA-GAMLSS), the gradients of the dependent variable
(logarithmic output quantity) with respect to the explanatory variables (logarithmic input quantities)
can be interpreted as partial output elasticities. Unlike the SFA-BC model, the semiparametric
specification allows (marginal) effects of the explanatory variables to differ between observations
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without being restricted by an arbitrarily chosen functional form (Czekaj and Henningsen 2012).15
These observation-specific output elasticities are reported in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Gradients (output elasticities) estimated by the semiparametric model for various input levels.
As can be seen in the figure, the estimated output elasticities with respect to land and labor
fluctuate around the corresponding parameter estimated by the SFA-BC model, while I observe much
more heterogeneity for output elasticity with respect to capital. Based on these individual elasticities,
I report the returns to scale implied by the semiparametric model and its relation to the output, as in
Figure 2. Consistent with the parametric model, all farms operate under increasing returns to scale,
with the majority of returns to scales ranging between 1.05 and 1.3. Additionally, there exists a Ushaped relationship between output and returns to scale – farms producing around the median may

In other words, farms can adopt different production technologies and as a result, observation-specific measures of the
production technology may be estimated.
15
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gain less from increasing inputs compared to the rest of farms.

Figure 2: Elasticities of scale and relationship with farm size obtained by the semiparametric model.
Turning next to the factors affecting technical efficiency, I can see that the SFA-GAMLSS
highlights greater statistical significance for all coefficient estimates. In the case of the SFA-BC, only
the extension service variable is statistically significant in explaining the mean of the technical
inefficiency (u). By contrast, all contextual variables are significant in the SFA-GAMLSS, though with
differing levels of statistical significance. With the exception of the intercept and the dummy variable
for other crop areas, the signs of other contextual variables are consistent across two specifications.
Overall, the results given by the semiparametric specification are coherent with the relevant literature,
which I discuss below.
First, households with an older household head are on average less efficient, perhaps because
they are in general more conservative than their younger counterparts. Younger farmers should be
more inclined to adopt new management practices that are able to use the available resources more
efficiently (Chirwa 2007; Langyintuo and Mulugetta 2005). Older farmers, on the other hand, may rely
more on their experience with the current technology and are slow in adapting to the newer, more
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efficient practices.
Second, male-headed households appear to be more efficient than female-headed households.
A large volume of literature has documented the cultural or social biases (e.g., customs, traditions,
religious beliefs, social norms, etc.) against women that have led to an asymmetric distribution of
resources and responsibilities, especially in less developed countries (Alene and Manyong 2008;
Abdulai, Nkegbe, and Donkoh 2013). These biases not only place restrictions on women’s activities
but also limit their ability to access new information and technologies, weakening their technical
efficiency in agricultural production as compared to male farmers. Additionally, Doss (2001)
concluded that based on evidence from 25 years of literature on agricultural production in Africa,
female farmers are often not contacted by extension services even if they have access to such services,
further lowering their production efficiency.
Households who have access to extension services are more efficient in maize production.
Indeed, extension services not only provide the platform for acquiring new information that promotes
technology adoption, but also reduce the negative effect due to a lack of formal education in the
overall decision to adopt new technologies. Owens, Hoddinott, and Kinsey (2003) found that access
to extension services raised farm production by about 15% in resettlement areas of Zimbabwe.
Birkhaeuser, Evenson, and Feder (1991) show that contact with extension services could raise farm
efficiency by as high as 27%. the results suggest that among all variables considered, access to
extension services have the largest impact on technical efficiency.
Additionally, the results from SFA-GAMLSS suggest that working with other types of crops
reduces the technical efficiency of maize production for A1 households. While crop diversification is
often associated with traditional benefits such as increased farm resilience and higher spatial and
temporal biodiversity, it may be difficult for smallholder farmers to achieve a high yield when engaging
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in multiple-crop production due to the lack of ability in efficiently managing multiple crops. However,
the magnitude of this effect is relatively small compared to other contextual variables.
Efficiency scores implied from the two models are reported in Figure 3. Mean efficiency is
0.746 for the semiparametric model and 0.738 for the parametric model. The distributions of the
efficiency scores from the two specifications bear a close resemblance. These results are confirmed by
the high Spearman and Kendall correlation coefficients between the efficiency scores from the two
models, which are equal to 0.927 and 0.777, respectively.

Figure 3: Efficiency score for the two model competitors for A1 farmers: parametric (SFA-BC) and
semiparametric (SFA-GAMLSS).
To better understand the results, I analyze the λ parameter which represents the relative
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variability between the technical inefficiency and the random error, i.e., the relative contribution of v
and u on ε (Kumbhakar and Lovell 2000). If λ → 0, the model excludes the presence of technical
inefficiency and on the other hand, the stochastic frontier model degenerates into a Deterministic
Frontier Analysis (DFA) type if λ → +∞, (Aigner and Chu 1968), where every departure from the
frontier is due only to technical inefficiency. For the SFA-BC (parametric) model I find that λ = 3.404
while for the SFA-GAMLSS (semiparametric) model λ = 2.109, both suggesting the greater
importance of technical inefficiency than random disturbances in production shortfalls from the
frontier. The higher value of λ in the SFA-BC model can be explained by the fact that the
semiparametric model captures more variability associated to the inputs and to the contextual variables
in the conditional expectation structure of the frontier.

1.4.2. Full Sample Analysis using both A1 and A2 Households
Next I consider the full sample that includes both A1 and A2 farmers. I estimate the same
models as those specified and reported in Table 2 except for excluding ‘otherarea’ variable in the
technical efficiency equation and adding a dummy variable indicating the type of farmers (A1 = 1) in
the mean equation. Results are reported in Table 3.
As can be seen in Table 3, with the only exceptions of the type of farms and capital investment the
semiparametric and fully parametric models highlight similar statistical significance for all other
coefficient estimates. Estimation results suggest that A1 farmers have a slightly lower mean. output as
compared to A2 households, and this difference is statistically significant in the SFA-GAMLSS model.
With regard to the contextual variables, I find that access to extension services is the only factor
statistically significant for both models. The λ for SFA-BC is close to the boundary of the parameter
space, which may be attributable to model misspecification or again, to a less flexible specification in
the production function.
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Table 3: Estimation Results for A1 and A2 Farm Households.
SFA-BC
Production function
Intercept
Type (A1 = 1)
Land
Labor
Capital

Est
5.389
-0.053
0.579
0.499
0.077

Contextual variables
Est
Intercept
Male
Age
Extension
λ

0.569
-0.085
0.003
-0.168

SFA-GAMLSS

SE
0.392
0.047
0.083
0.076
0.049

Pr(>|z|)
0.000***
0.254
0.000***
0.000***
0.114

LRT/Est
8.832
-0.088
295.701
298.643
156.732

SE
0.024
0.040

Pr(Chi)/Pr(>|t| )
0.000***
0.028**
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***

SE
0.117
0.063
0.002
0.057

Pr(>|z|)
0.000***
0.176
0.162
0.003**

Est
-1.177
-0.051
0.002
-0.353

SE
0.274
0.123
0.004
0.124

Pr(>|t|)
0.000***
0.677
0.689
0.005**

1e+08

1.699
Signif. codes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

The estimated gradients of the dependent variable with respect to each explanatory variable
for the semiparametric model are reported in Figure 4. As in the sub-sample analysis for A1 farms, I
observe much more heterogeneity for output elasticity with respect to capital, and that all farms
operate under increasing returns to scale with most farms having an elasticity of scale around 1.1.
Unlike the sub-sample analysis of A1 farms, efficiency scores generated from the two models for the
full sample are quite different – the mean efficiency scores are 0.772 and 0.595 for the SFA-GAMLSS
and SFA-BC, respectively. The disparity can be partly attributed to the different statistical significances
associated with the type of farm and the capital investment variables in the mean equation in the two
models. The higher efficiency scores generated from the SFA-GAMLSS specification may also be a
result of its ability to accommodate heterogeneous technologies when estimating the mean equation
as compared to the fully parametric model.
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Figure 4: Output elasticities and elasticities of scale from semiparametric models.
Finally, I plot in Figure 5 the technical efficiency score for each household against their maize
output based on the estimation results from both models. As can be seen, the level of technical
efficiency tends to rise as the output increases, suggesting the need to increase inputs for maize
production so that higher efficiency can be reached. All in all, the analysis produced some interesting
results regarding the technical efficiency of smallholder maize production in Zimbabwe. The estimated
mean technical efficiency score I obtained appears to be higher than in both Mango et al. (2015) and
Ndlovu et al. (2014), who found the efficiency level to be around 0.65 and 0.68, respectively.
A possible contributor to the discrepancies is the use of different study areas – while Mazowe,
one of the most productive areas for maize production in Zimbabwe, is considered in the present
study, the other two studies analyzed regions with less productive areas.
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Figure 5: Efficiency estimated by semiparametric and parametric models against log(output).
Findings from this paper may, therefore, be considered an upper-bound for maize production
technical efficiency in Zimbabwe. Regardless, the results are consistent with previous studies that there
exists a high level of technical inefficiency in Zimbabwe among smallholder maize producers after the
implementation of the FTLRP. For comparison, Seyoum, Battese, and Fleming (1998) reported that
the mean technical efficiency score for maize producers in Ethiopia is 0.866. Tchale and Sauer (2007)
report that the efficiency of maize production in Malawi is 0.91 for farmers applied integrated soil
fertility management and 0.79 for those who did not. In Cameroon, Binam et al. (2004) find the mean
technical efficiency of maize production to be 0.75. While these results are clearly dependent upon the
specific estimation method and data employed, they nevertheless indicate that the efficiency of maize
production in Zimbabwe, especially those from smallholder farmers, could significantly be improved.
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1.5 Conclusion
In this study, I evaluate the technical efficiency of maize production among smallholder
farmers in Zimbabwe, an important issue as the country moves from large commercial farm
agriculture to smallholder production under the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP).
Specifically, I seek to answer if smallholder farmers are efficiently allocating their land, labor and
capital resources when producing maize and what determines variations in efficiency levels after the
implementation of the FTLRP, a controversial policy that has caused radical changes in the land tenure
system in Zimbabwe. I find that beneficiaries of the FTLRP in Zimbabwe are not efficiently utilizing
their available agricultural resources in maize production. The average efficiency level appears to be
under 0.75 when only A1 farms are considered. When both types of farmers are included, the average
efficiency of maize production among smallholder farmers is 0.772 for the semiparametric
specification and 0.595 for the fully parametric model. Among other things considered, gender and
age of the household head, access to extension services and activities of other crops significantly affect
farmers’ efficiency levels. Results suggest a large output improvement potential if the farmers can
adopt more advanced management practices and use the available resources more efficiently.
This paper complements existing studies on the technical efficiency of maize production in
Zimbabwe after the implementation of FTLRP, providing additional insights into ways that can raise
maize productivity that has fallen rapidly over the past decade. From a methodological point of view,
the semiparametric stochastic frontier production model employed in the present analysis represents
a significant improvement over the fully parametric stochastic frontier models commonly used in
agricultural technical efficiency analyses (e.g., Mango et al. 2015). The SFA-GAMLSS specification
not only allows for flexible production functions, but also assumes that exogenous variables affect the
individual output by affecting the conditional expectation structure of the production frontier. Since
the true form of the frontier is rarely known and in practice, it is impossible to measure how well any
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chosen functional form approximates the true production function, the semiparametric model could
allow a more precise estimation of the frontier. Additionally, the failure to model the exogenous
factors in the conditional mean equation as in Battese and Coelli (1995) may lead to biased estimation
of the production frontier model and the level of technical inefficiency.
This paper points to the importance of developing conducive policies to encourage investment
in maize production as both types of farmers demonstrate increasing returns to scale. Policies should
be made to allow for easy access to key inputs such as fertilizers and machinery, as well as agricultural
credits to allow further investment. Additionally, securing the land tenure system could also greatly
increase the total output as smallholder farmers may be reluctant to make land conservation or other
capital and labor investments under the current land redistribution policy. The resulting agricultural
intensification can further improve maize production efficiency as supported by the positive
relationship between the technical efficiency score and the level of output found by both
semiparametric and fully parametric models.
Given the significant role of extension services in lowering technical inefficiency, there is a
great need to expand extension access and encourage more extension visits to farmers. Extension
services only help farmers make better use of existing resources by improving their management skills
but may also increase the output by encouraging farmers to devote more capital and labor for maize
production. the analysis also points to the need for implementing innovative extension practices based
on a gender equitable approach. Jiggins, Samanta, and Olawoye (1997) noted that providing female
farmers access to extension services not only improves these farmers’ agricultural output, but also
boosts the efficiency of the overall agricultural sector and enhance the national food security. Some
previous studies reported evidence of a diminishing gap between female and male-headed households
when the extension service agents employ a large number of women extension agents Alene and
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Manyong (2008). Results of the present study suggest that policymakers should aim to reduce gender
gaps, to increase access to agricultural advisory services, and to stimulate younger household in
agricultural production since they may be more open to new management practices.
Although improving technical efficiency could boost maize output in Zimbabwe, it is also
critically important for the government and other international organizations to invest in research and
technology development. Productivity growth, as is well established in the literature, can be attributed
to both technical change and technical efficiency. While improving technical efficiency can enhance
maize output given the existing production technology, technical advances will shift the production
frontier outward and increase the total output possible given the existing resources. Policymakers
should strive to improve the macroeconomic environment for agricultural production, facilitating
technology transfers from developed economies and stimulating research and technology
development. Furthermore, a conducive general economic environment also helps attract attracting
investment into the agricultural sector, further improving total maize output.
One limitation of the paper is that I only consider the farm households in Mazowe, one of the
most productive regions for maize production in Zimbabwe. Given the heterogeneous nature of maize
production in the country, results presented in the paper cannot provide the full picture of technical
efficiency of smallholder maize system in Zimbabwe. Results obtained in this study may therefore be
best considered an upper bound for technical efficiency of maize production in Zimbabwe after the
FTLRP. Future study may wish to use a sample representative of the entire Zimbabwean farm
households so that a more accurate estimate of technical efficiency may be obtained.
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CHAPTER 2. Elasticity of Substitution and Technical Efficiency: Evidence from US
Electricity Generation.

Abstract
The implications of national or regional energy policies for technical
efficiency and environmental outcomes in electricity generation depend on
fossil fuel input substitution. This study uses state level data to examine fossil
fuel (coal and natural gas) substitution in electricity generation under increased
availability of natural gas in the United States. I observe that changes in
elasticities of substitution from pre-2009 to post-2009 differ across states
suggesting that the effects of increased availability of inexpensive natural gas
on electricity generation have been spatially heterogeneous. I rely on the
observed heterogeneity to assess the effects of fossil fuel input substitution on
technical efficiency and CO2 emissions. The results reveal that state level
elasticity of substitution between natural gas and coal has a positive effect on
technical efficiency and a negative effect on CO2 emissions. Therefore, future
policy design and analyses should reflect the implications for regional
elasticities of fossil fuel substitution and associated environmental outcomes
Keywords: Elasticity of substitution, electricity, technical efficiency, frontier
analysis, natural gas, coal.

JEL CLASSIFICATION: Q3, Q4.
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2.1 Introduction
Electricity generation sector has been subject to close regulatory oversight targeting
competitiveness of electricity markets, grid access, and environmental quality objectives (Ko and Dahl,
2001). Effectiveness of such policies in part depends on the electric power sector’s adjustment in
terms of fuel use mix. For example, adjustments in fuel use can influence technical efficiency and
carbon emissions in electricity generation, which are often targeted by regulatory programs and
policies (Knittel, 2002, EPA 2019). I examine the changes in regional (state) fossil fuel substitution
elasticities following increased availability of natural gas from unconventional production in the US.
Specifically, I examine the implications of changes in regional elasticities of substitution between coal
and natural gas for technical efficiency and carbon emissions.
State-level fuel substitution elasticities in the electricity generation sector are important for
policymaking and planning purposes because policies, institutional and regulatory contexts, resource
endowments, technology, infrastructure, and the historical development of electric power systems and
regulatory policies often differ across states. For example, the Midwestern states in the US historically
have had more coal-fired capacity relative to other states (Dahl and Ko, 1998). As a result, fuel
consumption and substitution capacities in these states can differ from other states. Environmental
regulations, like the renewable portfolio standards (RPS), also differ across states (Maguire and
Munasib, 2016; Palmer and Burtraw, 2005). Additionally, electricity market deregulation differences
across states led to divergent state level generation technology investment decisions (Csereklyei and
Stern, 2018), with corresponding regional implication for fossil fuel input substitutability. While the
importance of regional patterns of substitution has been recognized for policy analysis and evaluation
(Uri, 1977; Bopp and Costello, 1990; Dahl and Ko, 1998; Gao et al., 2013), state level analysis of
substitution has been lacking.
Regional-level substitution among fossil fuels in electricity generation can come from either
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substitution at individual utilities or substitution across utilities. Substitution at individual utilities
occurs either through fuel switching or through adjustments in the queuing order of generation
facilities with varying mixes of fuel consumption. Substitution across utilities takes place through bulk
transfers of power across utilities within and across regions (Dahl and Ko, 1998). At the state level,
such substitution capabilities are subject to regulatory parameters and the availability of appropriate
technology, infrastructure, and resources.
Implications for technical efficiency are important to examine because regulatory programs
and policies in the electricity generation sector often seek to improve energy generation efficiency.
Thermal efficiency-based programs aim to reduce the “heat rate” of generation facilities and thus
improve generation efficiency (Knittel, 2002; Joskow and Schmalensee, 1986). For example, recent
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) rule relies on
improvements in heat rates to control emissions of air pollutants from existing generation units (EPA,
2019). Heat rate, or technical efficiency, measures the amount of energy (Btu) used to generate a unit
of electricity (kWh). Although the effect of policies and regulations on electric industry performance
can be examined in terms of measures like trends in electricity rates, technical productive efficiency
measures provide a more straightforward representation of efficiency (Goto and Tsutsui, 2008).
Regulations pertaining to the effects of electricity generation on environmental quality have
attracted significant attention from policy makers because the electric power industry is one of the
major contributors to greenhouse gas emissions. In the US, electricity production constitutes roughly
one-third of greenhouse gas emissions via fossil fuel consumption (EPA, 2014). Consequently,
numerous policies have been introduced to improve energy efficiency and/or promote
renewable/clean energy development initiatives including but not limited to the Energy Policy Act of
2005, the Climate Action Plan of 2013, the Clean Power Plan (CPP) of 2014, and most recently
Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) rule of 2019. In 2015, the EPA finalized the carbon dioxide emission
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standards for existing and new power plants pursuant to section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act. The
guidelines articulated state-specific limits in terms of the amount of carbon dioxide emissions per
megawatt-hour of net electricity generation, aiming at a 30% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions
relative to 2005 levels by 2030. Similarly, in 2019, reversing the guidelines of the CPP, the EPA released
the ACE rule where states are responsible for developing respective performance standards that
achieve targeted improvements in generation efficiencies at particular types of existing generation units
(EPA, 2019).
Changes in fossil fuel supply can have heterogeneous implications for regional electricity
generation under constrained shipment capacity. According to the estimates of the US Energy
Information Administration (EIA), daily production of dry shale gas in the US increased from 2.5
billion cubic feet in 2002 to 43 billion cubic feet in 2016. The productivity of natural gas wells has
been steadily increasing because of ongoing improvements in the precision and efficiency of
horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing. The increase in natural gas availability has had a significant
impact on electricity generation sector.
Since 2008, coal consumption in electricity generation has been declining, while consumption
of natural gas has been increasing (Figure 6). These adjustments are not surprising considering the
recent increase in the costs of coal-based electricity generation relative to natural gas-based electricity
generation (Van Kooten et al., 2013). The growth in the availability of inexpensive natural gas and
corresponding adjustments in the electricity generation industry, including infrastructure and
generation capacity, have implications for elasticities of fuel substitution. Observing structural beaks
in most of the data series in 2009, I examine the differences in fossil fuel substitution elasticities across
states pre and post 2009 and evaluate corresponding implications for technical efficiency and CO2
emissions.
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Figure 6. Fuel use for electricity production in the US (Million BTUs)
In this study, I focus on the substitution patterns between coal and natural gas as the primary
fossil fuels used in electricity generation. Although the empirical model includes oil-based generation,
I focus on coal and natural gas because these fuels represent an overwhelming majority of fossil fuelbased generation. Ramping capabilities of active fossil fuel power plants have significant implications
for peaking power generation to meet electricity demand in real-time. Therefore, coal and natural gas
substitution patterns are important to consider when evaluating or designing state-level policies
intended to influence fossil fuel consumption mix in electricity generation16.

I reserve the examination of electricity generation from renewable sources for a later study. While renewable and nuclear
sources are mainly used for baseload electricity generation, day-to-day fuel substitution comes mostly from fossil fuels
subject to technological constraints (Dahl and Ko, 1998). Technological improvements in storage and transmission at
some point in time will allow for more flexibility in renewable energy utilization. However, at this time the opportunity
for substitution with renewable energy remains limited due to the variable nature of wind and solar energy and due to lack
of adequate storage capacity.
16
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2.2 Methodology
First, I use linear panel regression models with shares of coal and natural gas relative to total
fossil fuels as functions of prices, electricity generation, and renewable energy policy to describe the
changes in fossil fuel consumption in electricity generation at state scale. Next, I quantify the changes
in state level elasticities of substitution between coal and natural gas before and after 2009 and examine
the corresponding implications for technical efficiency and CO2 emissions.
2.2.1. Inter-fuel Substitution
Majority of input substitution studies rely on the translog cost function-based approach to
quantify elasticities of substitution (Bernstein and Parmeter, 2019; Zhang and Lin, 2019; Jia and Shao
2018; Wesseh and Lin, 2016; Li and Lin, 2016; Shahiduzzaman and Alam, 2014; Ma et al. 2012;
Soderholm, 2001; Dahl and Ko, 1998; Griffin, 1977). Limited attention has been given to the
examination of inter-fuel substitution at sub-regional scales. Using translog specification of the cost
function for electricity generation and associated cost share equations for coal, natural gas, and oil,
Gao et al., (2013) studied fuel substitution patterns across seven electricity generation regions in the
US based on annual region-level data from 2001 to 2008. They show that natural gas was a substitute
input for coal and oil to various degrees across seven electricity generation regions in the US. Similar
result was found by Uri (1977). Bopp and Costello, (1990) also used fuel share equations based on
translog specification of the cost function to examine elasticities of coal, gas, and oil use nationally
and across five regions in the US. They show that regionally explicit estimation is superior to national
level modeling in terms of revealing the underlying economics of electricity generation.
I follow prior literature to examine changes in fuel substitution elasticities obtained from a
translog specification of the cost function. Given a production function Y=f(X), elasticity of
substitution, originally introduced by Hicks (1932), measures the change in the relative factor
proportion Xi/Xj in response to the change in relative marginal rates of technical substitution fXi/fXj
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holding output Y constant, where fXi and fXj are partial derivatives of the production function with
respect to inputs Xi and Xj. Formally, the elasticity of substitution is expressed as  ij =

d ln( xi x j )
d ln( f x j / f xi )

.

In this study, the Allen partial elasticities of substitution, expressed in terms of cost function and its
derivatives, are used as  ij = CCij / Ci C j , where subscripts indicate partial derivatives with respect to
prices of inputs, i and j (Allen, 1938; Uzawa, 1962; Cristensen and Green, 1976; Dasgupta and Roy,
2015).
Following Shephard’s Lemma, (1970), cost-minimizing factor demands for a cost function
*
C = f ( Pc , PG , Po , Y , t ) , are obtained by xi = C ( P, Y ) Pi , where Pc , PG , Po , denote prices of coal,

natural gas, and oil, respectively, and i  C , G, O . Alternatively, by logarithmic differentiation, factor
cost share equations are si =  ln C ( P, Y )  ln Pi (Christensen and Green, 1976; Berndt and Wood,
1975). Following numerous previous studies, I use translog functional form for the cost function to
obtain factor cost share equations and elasticities of substitution (Griffin and Gregory, 1976; Taheri,
1994; Berndt and Wood, 1975; Dahl and Ko, 1998; Ko and Dahl, 2001; Bentzen, 2004; Gao et al.,
2013; Linden et al. 2013). The system of the cost function and the corresponding cost-share equations
is:
1
𝑙𝑛 𝐶 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖 𝑙𝑛 𝑃𝑖 + 𝛼𝑦 𝑙𝑛 𝑌 + 𝛼𝑦𝑦 (𝑙𝑛 𝑌)2 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑦 𝑙𝑛 𝑃𝑖 𝑙𝑛 𝑌 +
2
𝑖
𝑖
1
1
∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑗 𝑙𝑛 𝑃𝑖 𝑙𝑛 𝑃𝑗 + (𝛼𝑡 ) 𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡𝑡 𝑡 2 + 𝛼𝑦𝑡 𝑡 𝑙𝑛 𝑌 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑡 𝑡 𝑙𝑛 𝑃𝑖 (2.1)
2
2
𝑖

𝑗

𝑆𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑦 𝑙𝑛 𝑌 + ∑𝑗 𝛽𝑖𝑗 𝑙𝑛 𝑃𝑗 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡 𝑡

𝑖

(2.2)

where C is a vector of state level costs of fossil fuels used in electricity generation over time, Si is a
vector of cost shares of fuel i across states and over time, Pi and Pj are vectors of fuel prices across
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states and over time, and Y is a vector of fossil fuel based electricity generation across states and over
time. Assuming that price interaction parameters in the cost share equations are a linear function of
state dummy variables (Ds), the share equations are expressed as follows (Gao et al., 2013) with
subscript s denoting state.

𝑆𝑖𝑠 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑦 𝑙𝑛 𝑌𝑠 + ∑𝑗(𝛽𝑜𝑖𝑗 + ∑𝑠 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑠 𝐷𝑠 ) 𝑙𝑛 𝑃𝑗𝑠

(2.3)

In accordance with neo-classical production theory, and following extensive prior literature
(Linden et al. 2013; Bentzen, 2004; Dahl and Ko, 1998; Ko and Dahl, 2001; Christensen and Green,
1976), parameter restrictions for homogeneity and symmetry conditions are as follows:



i

=1

i



iy

=0

i

 = 
ij

j

ij

=0

i


 

ij =  ji =  oij +  ijs Ds  =  oji +   jis Ds  ; i = i ; iy = iy
s
s

 


The oil share equation is omitted from the estimation17. Following Berndt and Wood (1975),
Bentzen (2004), Griffin and Gregory (1976), Bopp and Costello (1990), Dahl and Ko, (1998), and
numerous other studies, cost share equations (2.3) are estimated as a system of equations. Natural gas
and coal share equations are estimated using seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) for each electricity
market region independently using state level data with state and time fixed effects and interaction
effects between prices and fixed effects.

Though not necessary for the purposes of this study, the parameter estimates for oil-based fuels can be obtained using
homogeneity and symmetry restrictions.
17
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Following prior literature (Dasgupta and Roy, 2015; Linden et al. 2013; Bentzen, 2004; Dahl
and Ko, 1998; Griffin and Gregory, 1976; Christensen and Green, 1976), state specific elasticities of
substitution are obtained as follows:
𝜎𝑖𝑗𝑠 =

((𝛽𝑜𝑖𝑗 +∑𝑠 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑠 𝐷𝑠 )+𝑆𝑖𝑠 𝑆𝑗𝑠 )
(𝑆𝑖𝑠 𝑆𝑗𝑠 )

(2.4)

2.2.2. Technical Efficiency Analysis
Technical inefficiency refers to production taking place in the interior of the production
possibility set, i.e., when output falls short of possible attainable level for a given use of inputs (Farrell,
1957). Non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) (Barros and Peypoch, 2008; Pacudan and
de Guzman, 2002; Von Hirschhausen et al., 2006) and parametric Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA)
(Filippini et al., 2004; Goto and Tsutsui, 2008; See and Coelli, 2012; Knittel, 2002; Von Hirschhausen
et al., 2006; Hattori, 2002) have been widely used to examine inefficiencies in the electricity industry.
Unlike SFA, DEA does not impose a specific functional relationship between inputs and outputs and
does not assume specific statistical distribution of the error structure. However, DEA does not
account for possible noise in the data and outliers can have a large effect on the result (Bravo-Ureta
et al., 2007). On the other hand, SFA models deviations from the frontier in terms of both technical
inefficiency and random errors that are outside of individual producers’ control. Although DEA and
SFA estimates produce remarkably similar conclusions (Von Hirschhausen et al., 2006; Wadud and
White, 2000), I use SFA because I am mostly interested in examining the relationship between
elasticities of substitution and inefficiencies post frontier estimation. In this respect SFA provides a
more convenient framework than mathematical programming-based DEA. Furthermore, while DEA
attributes all deviations from the frontier to inefficiencies, SFA factors in inefficiencies as well as
random errors.
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Earlier work on inefficiency with panel data includes Pitt and Lee, (1981) and Kalirajan, (1991),
where the stochastic frontier estimation was based on panel data. Apart from the ability to separate
individual and time effects from combined effects in efficiency estimation, the use of panel data also
avoids problems related to distributional assumptions as observed in cross section analysis (Schmidt
& Sickles, 1984). Fixed effects panel SFA is defined as follows (Greene, 2005; Chen et al., 2014):
(2.5)

𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑋𝑖𝑡 𝛽). exp {𝜀𝑖𝑡 };
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝑈𝑖𝑡 ;
𝑉𝑖𝑡 ~𝐼𝐼𝐷 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣2 );
𝑈𝑖𝑡 ~𝐼𝐼𝐷 𝑁 + (0, 𝜎𝑢2 );
For i = 1,2,3...N; t=1,2,3….T

where, 𝐶𝑖𝑡 represents the log of cost for the ith state at time t. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the vector of explanatory variables
and 𝛽 is the associated vector of technology parameters to be estimated. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a composite random
error with probability density function 𝜆 =

𝜎𝑢
⁄𝜎𝑣 and 𝜎 2 = 𝜎𝑢 2 + 𝜎𝑣 2 .

𝑉𝑖𝑡 is the normally

distributed random error. 𝑈𝑖𝑡 is the one sided, non-negative and half normally distributed disturbance
term that captures inefficiency (Cornwell et al., 1990).
I use translog functional form for the cost function in equation (2.5) (Atkinson & Cornwell,
1994a,b; Filippini et al., 2004; See and Coelli, 2012; Hattori, 2002; Khanna et al., 1999) as defined in
equation (2.1) to take advantage of its flexibility and to maintain consistency with estimation of
elasticities of substitution18. Estimates of inefficiencies obtained from model (2.5) (stage one) are used
in the post estimation analysis of inefficiencies according to equation (2.6) (stage two). Inefficiencies
𝑈𝑖𝑡 are expressed in terms of contextual variables (𝑍), including elasticities of substitution and state
characteristics which are not included in the set of production inputs in equation (2.5). The Z variables

18Elasticities

of substitution are estimated based on regressions for individual electric market regions with respective
interactions between prices and state fixed effects to obtain state specific elasticities.
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in the inefficiency model may also include input variables specified in the stochastic frontier model,
provided the inefficiency effects are stochastic (Battese and Coelli, 1995).
𝑈𝑖𝑡 (𝑍𝑖𝑡 , 𝜹) = 𝛿1 𝑍1𝑡 + 𝛿2 𝑍2𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝛿𝑛 𝑍𝑛𝑡 + 𝑊𝑖𝑡 ;

𝑊𝑖𝑡 ~𝐼𝑁(0, 𝜔2 ) (2.6)

Fixed effects estimation of the stochastic frontier model (2.5) may give inconsistent estimates
because the classical stochastic frontier models that use panel data provide no mechanism to separate
individual time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity from inefficiency (see Greene, 2005; Chen,
Schmidt and Wang, 2014; Belotti and Ilardi, 2017). To this effect, Greene (2005) proposed a true fixed
effect regression technique through maximum likelihood estimation (TFE-MLE), which accounts for
unmeasured cross-sectional heterogeneity based on the probability density function of the error term
(𝜀𝑖𝑡 ). The TFE-MLE approach made it possible to measure inefficiency and heterogeneity across
groups separately. However, the “Incidental parameters problem” in fixed effects specification of the
stochastic frontier model can lead to inconsistency (Chen, Schmidt and Wang, 2014; Belotti and Ilardi,
2017). Incidental parameters are “nuisance” parameters that increase as the number of groups in the
panel cross-section becomes large. As a result, fixed effects estimation of SFA can be inefficient
(Lancaster, 2000; Green 2005).
Chen et al. (2014) provide an alternative approach to address this problem using withinmaximum likelihood estimation (WMLE) for the true fixed effects model by exploiting a within-group
data transformation. Their maximum likelihood estimation is based only on the joint density of the
deviations from means. WMLE approach removes the individual effects by employing the within
group data transformation, where deviations from means of every variable in each group are used in
the estimation. However, Chen et al. (2014) estimation assumes both, the random white noise and the
inefficiency error components, to be homoscedastic. This assumption can affect inference in the SFA
framework (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). Belotti and Ilardi (2017) extended Chen et al. (2014) model
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using first-order autoregressive process to allow for either homoscedastic or heteroskedastic
inefficiency. They propose a marginalized maximum simulated likelihood estimation (MMSLE) based
on the marginalization of the inefficiency term via simulation. In this approach, first difference
estimation is used to eliminate nuisance parameters associated with fixed effects specification. The
disadvantage with MMSLE is that model convergence is difficult to attain with high T-dimension
(Belotti and Ilardi, 2017). In this study, I use TFE-MLE, WMLE, and MMSLE models for SFA. I
estimate TFE-MLE and MMSLE using a one-step procedure (where 𝜷 and 𝜹 are estimated
simultaneously combining steps one and two) following Caudill and Ford (1993) and Wang and
Schmidt (2002). WMLE is implemented in a two-step procedure to estimate equations (2.5) and (2.6)
respectively.
Although the relationship between elasticity of factor substitution and productivity has
previously been addressed (Klump and de La Granville 2000), I am not aware of any studies which
examine the relationship between technical inefficiencies and elasticities of substitution. Toward this
end, I estimate a stochastic frontier distance function to assess the association between inter-fuel
substitution and electricity generation inefficiency at the state scale. I am particularly interested in
examining the changes in technical efficiency in recent years due to changes in the elasticities of
substitution between coal and natural gas.

2.2.3. Inter-Fossil Fuel Substitution and CO2 Emissions
Next, I evaluate the relationship between interfuel substitution and CO2 emissions. I estimate
a linear panel regression model (equation 2.7) with state (𝛼𝑖 ) and time (𝛾𝑡 ) fixed effects to test whether
CO2 emissions respond to changes in elasticity of substitution between coal and natural gas.
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(2.7)
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where; Y is CO2 emissions, X is a vector of explanatory variables including elasticity of substitution
and εit is the error term for state i and time t. Equation (2.7) estimates the impact of the variation in
elasticity of substitution between coal and natural gas, electricity production, renewable portfolio
standards and the increase in the availability of natural gas on CO2 emissions in electricity generation.
Point estimates of the state level elasticities of substitution are used as obtained from the systems of
equations for each Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) electricity region.
2.3 Data
The dataset in this study consists of a panel of annual state-level observations from 2001 to
2017, including prices and quantities of fossil fuels used for electricity generation, as well as total
electricity generated from fossil fuels. The state-level consumption of coal, natural gas, and oil-based
fuels for electricity generation is obtained from EIA (2019a) and is measured in million British thermal
units (MMBTU) (Dahl and Ko, 1998). Oil-based fuels include petroleum liquids and petroleum coke
aggregated into a single variable representing oil-based fuels measured in MMBTU. State-level total
electricity production from coal, natural gas, and/or oil (MWH) across production types (electric
generators, commercial and industrial combined heat and power facilities) is obtained from EIA’s
state level data (EIA, 2019a). State-level prices for coal, natural gas, and oil in the electric power sector
($/MMBTU) are obtained from EIA’s SEDS (State Energy Data System) database (EIA, 2019b). Cost
shares are computed using state-level fuel prices, respective quantities used in electricity generation,
and total expenditures on coal, natural gas, and oil in electricity generation at the state level. Seven
states are excluded19 from the analysis because at least one of the three fuels is not used for electricity

The following states are included in the study Alabama: (AL), Alaska (AK), Arizona (AZ), Arkansas (AR), Colorado
(CO), Connecticut (CT), Delaware (DE), Florida (FL), Georgia (GA), Illinois (IL), Indiana (IN), Iowa (IA), Kansas (KS),
Kentucky (KY), Louisiana (LA), Maine (ME), Maryland (MD), Massachusetts (MA), Michigan (MI), Minnesota (MN),
Mississippi (MS), Missouri (MO), Montana (MT), Nebraska (NE), Nevada (NV), New Hampshire (NH), New Jersey (NJ),
New Mexico (NM), New York (NY), North Dakota (ND), Ohio (OH), Oklahoma (OK), Oregon (OR), Pennsylvania
(PA), South Carolina (SC), South Dakota (SD), Tennessee (TN), Texas (TX), Virginia (VA), Washington (WA), West
Virginia (WV), Wisconsin (WI) and Wyoming (WY). The following states are excluded: Hawaii (HI), Idaho (ID), Rhode
19
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generation, and no prices are available for those fuels. I also include state level data on renewable
portfolio standards obtained from the Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency
(DSIRE) database (Prasad and Munch, 2012; Crago and Chernyakhovskiy, 2017; Li and Yi, 2014).

2.4 Results
2.4.1. Variation in Fossil Fuel Mix in Electricity Generation
I explore the mix of fossil fuels used in electricity generation using linear panel data models
with state and time fixed effects. I focus on coal and natural gas because the use of petroleum oil in
electricity generation is minor relative to coal and natural gas. Table 4 shows state and time fixed
effects regression results for shares of coal and natural gas use in electricity generation relative to total
fossil fuel use in terms of relative MMBTUs. Two models are used to examine the change in respective
fuel shares over time. Both models include a binary Period variable (1 for 2009 and after, 0
otherwise)20. The results confirm a significant drop (increase) in the share of coal in model A (natural
gas in model B) after 2009, consistent with retirements and conversions of coal plants with limited
replacement as observed in EIA data. The EIA data show that at the end of 2011 about 1,308 coalfired generating units with a capacity of 310 GW were operating in the United States. However, in
2012 alone, 10.2 GW of coal-fired capacity was retired, representing about 3.2% of the 2011 total.
Table 4 results indicate significant negative (positive) own (cross) price effect of natural gas.
I also observe that the coefficient for electricity generation is negative and significant in model
A. This implies that growth in electricity generation from fossil fuels (see also EIA, 2017) is associated
with a significant drop in the share of coal relative to natural gas across states. The results in Table 4
Island (RI), North Carolina (NC), Utah (UT), California (CA) and Vermont (VT).
20
I use Zivot-Andrews (Zivot and Andrews, 2002) endogenous structural break test and the Chow test (Chow, 1960) for
individual data series to identify the break-date (the largest Chow statistic) among all possible break dates (Quandt, 1960;
Hansen, 2001). Figures 2.A1 and 2.A2 (in the Appendix) indicate 2009 as the most prevalent break date across the series.
Natural gas price series have a structural break in 2009 in more than 30 states.

49
suggest that on average, across states coal intensity of electricity generation has declined due to the
increased availability of low-priced natural gas. In addition to the direct substitution effect the impact
of lower natural gas prices maybe also manifested through its moderating impact on electricity prices
thereby reducing the economic viability of coal-based generators.
Table 4: State and Time Fixed Effect Regression Results for Fossil Fuel Shares in Electricity
Generation
A. Share Coal
B. Share N. Gas
Log Electricity Generation
-0.141 (0.05)***
0.117 (0.06)*
Coal Price

0.004 (0.03)

0.024 (0.03)

NG Price

0.018 (0.01)**

-0.020 (0.01)**

Period2

-0.209 (0.06)***

0.220 (0.06)***

RPS
R-Squared
Observations

-0.015 (0.03)
0.033 (0.03)
0.348
0.372
Balanced panel n=43, T=17 and N=731
Standard errors in brackets; Significance levels: 1% ‘***’ 5%’**’ 10% ‘*’

2.4.2. Fossil Fuel Substitution
Tables 5 and 6 show average substitution elasticities (σCN) and corresponding price elasticities
(own: εNN and εCC, and cross: εCN and εNC) for 2001-2008 and 2009-2017. Individual state elasticities
are obtained from electricity market specific regressions (system 2.3), as defined by FERC (2019), for
each of the two periods using state level data. The following electric power regions are considered:
MISO (Midcontinent), ISO-NE (New England), NYISO (New York), Northwest, PJM
(Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection), Southeast, Southwest, SPP (Southwest Power
Pool) and ERCOT (Texas). I formally test whether the respective mean elasticities across states in
each region changed significantly between two periods using pairwise tests. The results are provided
in the last columns of Tables 5 and 6. The null hypothesis is that there is no difference in mean
elasticities across the two periods. The results show that substitutability between coal and natural gas
increased post-2009 in MISO, Northwest, PJM, Southeast, SPP and NYISO. Three regions (ISO-NE,
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Southwest and ERCOT) show statistically insignificant changes. Hence, an increased supply of natural
gas enabled greater substitution between coal and natural gas on average in most regions and in most
states21. Significant changes coincide with increased capacity of gas-fired generation and retiring or
retrofitting coal-fired plants to meet emission standards (see FERC, 2012; Gao et al., 2013).

Electricity Regions

Table 5: Fossil Fuel Substitution Elasticities
Pre-2009
Post-2009
Mean
Mean

Pairwise T-Test
P-value

MISO

0.001(3.35)

0.92 (0.23)*

0.080*

ISO-NE
Northwest
PJM
Southeast
Southwest
SPP
NYISO
ERCOT

0.55 (0.91)
-0.76 (2.55)
-0.04 (0.48)
0.14 (0.29)
0.26 (0.48)
-0.22 (0.23)
-9.33 (0.05)***
2.85 (0.10)***

0.93 (1.02)
0.73 (0.62)
0.29 (0.28)
0.40 (0.31)
0.33 (0.08)
0.72 (1.36)
1.22 (0.18)**
0.83 (1.69)

0.33
0.05**
0.06*
0.08*
0.44
0.05**
0.00***
0.10

Significance levels: 1% ‘***’ 5%’**’ 10% ‘*’
Heterogeneity of elasticities across states (as indicated by high relative standard deviations) in
each region, illustrates the complexity of the interdependencies that can be disguised by regional and
national elasticity estimates. The elasticities of substitution vary even among the states within the
electricity markets (see Table 2.A1 in the Appendix). For example, the elasticities of substitution
between coal and natural gas are statistically significant in CT pre and post-2009 and insignificant in
other states in the ISO-NE region. In the PJM region, only VA had a significant elasticity of
substitution between coal and natural gas in the pre-2009 period. In the Southwestern region, only
AZ has significant elasticities of substitution in both periods.

Table 2.A1 (in the Appendix) provides estimated substitution elasticities for states with statistically significant
estimates.
21
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Estimates
Own Price Elasticities
εCoal-Coal
εN.Gas-N.Gas
Cross Price Elasticities
εCoal-N.Gas
εN.Gas-Coal

Table 6: Price Elasticities
Pre 2009
Post 2009
Mean Std. Dev.
Mean
Std. Dev.

Pairwise Test
P-value

-0.228 0.235
-0.289 0.461

0.277
0.198

-0.150
-0.385

0.373
0.276

0.050 0.147
0.329
0.341
-0.117 1.164
0.283
0.198
Significance levels: 1% ‘***’ 5% ‘**’ 10% ‘*’

0.009***
0.014**

On average own price elasticities for natural gas (coal) increased (decreased) across the two
periods (Table 6). I estimated price elasticities at the state level and confirmed that own price elasticities
for natural gas (εNN) and coal (εCC) have expected signs in both periods22. Own price elasticities are
comparable to the estimates in prior literature. Ko and Dahl (2001) use monthly US 1993 data to
obtain national coal own price elasticity of -0.6 and natural gas own price elasticity of -1.5. Gao et al.,
(2013) use data from seven US electricity market regions from 2001 to 2008 and report own price
elasticities for coal demand ranging between -1.76 and -0.07, and for natural gas ranging between 0.75 to -0.19. I observe that changes in own price elasticities from before to after 2009 are
heterogeneous across states even when states are located in the same electricity market (Table 2.A2
and 2.A3 in the Appendix). For example, in the PJM region, statistically significant coal own price
elasticities are observed in WV and VA but not in MD, OH and NJ. On average the results in Table
6 indicate an increase in cross price elasticities in 2009-2017 relative to 2001-2008. The changes are
again heterogeneous across regions and states (Tables 2.A4 and 2.A5 in Appendix).

Tables 2.A2 to 2.A5 (in the Appendix) provide estimates of own price and cross price elasticities for states where
estimates are statistically significant.
22
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2.4.3. Stochastic Frontier Analysis
The results from the Stochastic Frontier regressions are provided in Table 7.23 Probability
density function (λ ) and variances of the disturbances (𝜎𝑢 and 𝜎𝑣 ) from the TFE-MLE model suggest
that the variability in the frontier estimation is also emanating from technical inefficiency. BreuschPagan and White statistic tests for heteroscedasticity of the inefficiency term across states fail to reject
the constant variance assumption. In this respect, WMLE and MMSLE models are equally appropriate
(Belotti and Ilardi, 2017). Translog cost function estimation in TFE-MLE and WMLE is based on
state and time fixed effects. On the other hand, MMSLE failed to converge with time fixed effects in
the pre-estimation as expected (Belotti and Ilardi, 2017). Therefore, in Table 7, I provide the results
from only the TFE-MLE and WMLE models with state and time fixed effects in the cost function24.
TFE-MLE results are preferred because they are based on a one-step estimation procedure (Wang
and Schmidt, 2002). The results in Table 7 exclude time fixed effects in the second stage because I am
interested in the average effect of the pre and post-2009 period on the inefficiencies25.
The negative and significant coefficients for log of electricity generation (𝛿2 ) in Model B
indicate that efficiency is gained when more electricity is generated as one would expect based on
economies of scale. This result is consistent with prior finding pertaining to the economies of scale in
the US electricity generation (Kwoka, 2005; Knittel, 2002). Cost ratio of coal and natural gas has a
significant effect on inefficiency based in the TFE-MLE. Cost ratio impacts depend on the combined
effects of changes in fuel quantities and prices. Since natural gas is more efficient than coal (Knittel,
2002; Seifert et al., 2016; See and Coelli, 2012; EIA, 2012a), I expect inefficiency to drop with increase

I only show results from the inefficiency model and skip coefficient estimates from the translog cost function because
the interest at this point pertains to the determinants of inefficiency. Estimates from the translog SFA cost function are
available upon request.
24
The results from the MMSLE model without the time fixed effects are available upon request.
25
The results from TFE-MLE and WMLE models with state and time fixed effects in both stages are available upon
request. The conclusion from these results are similar to the results in Table 7 in terms of the effect of the elasticities of
substitution and electricity generation on inefficiencies.
23
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in the share of natural gas over coal. However, the cost ratio also depends on the relative prices of
coal and natural gas. Increase in the relative price of coal leads to an increase in the use of natural gas.
Hence, the combined effect of prices and quantities on the cost ratio is theoretically ambiguous.
Table 7: Stochastic Frontier Estimation Results (TFE –MLE; Green 2005)
Variable description
A. TFE –MLE;
B. WMLE;
(Green 2005)
(Chen et al., 2014)
Est (Std. Error)
Est (Std. Error)
a
LL Log Likelihood
191.650
a
2.525 (0.01)***
λ Lambda
a
0.298 (0.00)***
𝜎𝑢 Sigma_u
a
0.118 (0.01)***
𝜎𝑣 Sigma_v
Inefficiency Parameters
0.063 (0.04)
-0.034 (0.01)***
𝛿1 Per-capita energy consumption
Log
of
electricity
generation
-0.041
(0.04)
-0.073 (0.04)**
𝛿2
-3.306 (0.43)***
-0.1*10-3 (0.0)
𝛿3 Cost ratio (Coal/NG)
-0.637 (0.26)**
0.019 (0.03)
𝛿4 Renewable Portfolio Standards
-0.1*10-4(0.0)*
𝛿5 Net addition of generation capacity -0.1*10-4(0.00)
-0.146 (0.05)***
-0.001 (0.00)*
𝛿6 Elasticity of substitution, σC-NG
0.062 (0.04)
0.004 (0.00)
𝛿7 Time
-0.106 (0.39)
-0.024 (0.03)
𝛿8 Period2
Panel data
T=17, n=43; N=731
Standard errors in brackets; parameters not reported a; Significance levels: 1% ‘***’ 5%’**’ 10% ‘*’
Statistically significant coefficients of the elasticity of substitution (𝛿6 ) indicate that an increase
in the elasticity of substitution between coal and natural gas improves technical efficiency. These
results provide evidence of the positive relationship between the elasticity of substitution and technical
efficiency. Previous studies have discussed the relevance of the elasticity of substitution for economic
growth, technical change, and productivity (Hicks, 1932; de La Grandville, 1989; Klump and de La
Grandville 2000). However, the role of elasticity of substitution for energy production efficiency has
not been addressed. the results show a negative effect of the elasticity of substitution between coal
and natural gas on technical inefficiency in fossil fuel based electricity generation.
The results (Model A) also show that renewable portfolio standards (RPS) have a positive
effect on technical efficiency. If natural gas based generation complements adoption of renewables,
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then greater adoption of renewables and greater natural gas based generation may be expected to
improve technical efficiency of fossil fuel based generation. Greater use of natural gas relative to coal
would be expected to yield gains in technical efficiency of fossil fuels-based electricity generation
(Knittel, 2002; Seifert et al., 2016; See and Coelli, 2012). On the other hand, if growth in renewable
energy is not necessarily accompanied with an increase in natural gas based generation, then the effect
of RPS and the associated increase in renewable generation on technical efficiency is theoretically
ambiguous.
Previous literature has documented a positive association between time and energy generation
inefficiency using both aggregate (Fatima and Barik, 2012) and plant level data (See and Coelli, 2012;
Seifert, Cullman and von Hirschhausen, 2016; Hattori, 2002; Khanna et al., 1999). Increase in
inefficiency over time is generally attributed to deteriorating equipment. However, retirements of older
power plants and installation of newer power plants are expected to improve technical efficiency. the
results show that time (𝛿7 ) and period dummy (𝛿8 ) are statistically not significant. The data show that
during 2001-2017 about 6.1GW were retired on average per year across all states, which is less than
2.3% of total generation. 16.3GW on average was added each year. The decrease in inefficiency
(though not statistically significant) in the 2009-2017 period is consistent with the overall increase in
natural gas based electricity generation relative to coal based generation. Natural gas-based generation,
which is more efficient than coal-based generation (Knittel 2002, EIA 2012a) has been steadily
increasing EIA (2012b).
I also observe that inefficiency decreased in most states but increased in some states across
the two periods. Overall, estimated inefficiency scores range from 0.09 to 0.46 with mean 0.19 and are
comparable to estimates in previous literature. Chen et al., (2014) used a panel of US steam electric
power generation data to estimate stochastic frontier production function. They found mean technical
inefficiencies of 0.111 and 0.107 using WMLE and TFE-MLE, respectively. Rungsuriyawiboon and
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Stefanou, (2007) used US utilities data from 1986 to 1999 for steam electric power generation and
found inefficiency scores in the range of 0.212 to 0.265. Knittel, (2002) found mean technical
inefficiency of 0.1757 using data from a large set of coal and natural gas generation units from 1981
to 1996.
2.4.4. Fossil Fuel Substitution and CO2 Emissions
Technical efficiency in electricity generation has implications for CO2 emissions (Lee, &
Zhang., (2012); Guo, Zhu, Fan, & Xie., (2011); Zhou, Ang, & Poh., (2008)). Having observed a
negative relationship between technical inefficiency and elasticity of substitution I examine the
relationship between inter-fuel substitution and carbon dioxide emissions using state and time fixed
effects regression. Electricity producers minimize costs (equation (2.1)), in response to fuel prices with
corresponding implications for technical efficiency and CO2 emissions. As a result, fossil fuel
substitution induced by relative price changes of coal and natural gas can affect carbon emission. The
standard panel regression model (equation (2.7)), with state and time fixed effects, is used to test
whether CO2 emissions respond to changes in elasticity of substitution between coal and natural gas.
Results from the regression are reported in Table 8.
The results in Table 8 show that the elasticity of substitution between coal and natural gas has
a significant and negative association with CO2 emissions. This result is consistent with Suh (2019) in
terms of confirming the significance of interfuel substitution for CO2 emissions. An increase in the
state level elasticity of substitution between coal and natural gas leads to a decrease in CO2 emissions.
In this respect, natural gas can be viewed as an important resource for reducing the carbon footprint
of electricity generation relative to more coal-intensive generation when additional natural gas based
generation increases substitution elasticity (see Sims, Rogner and Gregory, 2003). the results also
indicate that with increased availability of natural gas post-2009, CO2 emissions decreased. These
results are important for formulating or implementing energy and environmental policies because
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inter-fuel substitution has implications for CO2 emissions.
Table 8: State and Time Fixed Effects Regression Results for CO2 Emissions
Dep-log CO2 Emissions
Coef (Std. Error)
Electricity production
0.512 (0.09)***
Elasticity of substitution
-0.005 (0.00)*
RPS
-0.019 (0.03)
Period2
-0.224 (0.03)***
Constant
11.96 (0.99)***
R-sq
0.75
Observations
n=43, T=17 and N=731
Standard errors in brackets; Significance levels: 1% ‘***’ 5%’**’ 10% ‘*’

2.5 Conclusion
Heterogeneity of elasticities across major electricity production regions in the US has been
documented in previous literature (Gao et al., 2013). This study shows that the differences in terms
of elasticities of substitution, as well as technical inefficiencies, can be observed not only across major
electricity regions but also across the states within those regions. The elasticities of substitution differ
even across states that are located within the ten major electricity regions, as defined by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (Gao et al., 2013). Furthermore, I observe significant heterogeneity
of technical inefficiency across states. Such heterogeneity may be present due to differences in
resource endowments, technologies, institutional backgrounds, or state policies. The results show that
elasticities of substitution have a statistically significant relation with technical efficiency and carbon
emissions in electricity generation. I find that an increase in the elasticity of substitution between
natural gas and coal has a positive relation with technical efficiency and a negative effect on CO2
emissions. I also observe that state level elasticities of substitution and technical inefficiencies pre- and
post- 2009 changed differently across states.
The results imply that changes in generation technology mix can influence technical efficiency
in part through associated changes in coal and natural gas substitution elasticity. These findings suggest
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the need for careful analysis and planning for anticipated retirements of power generation units at
regional scales. Over the past ten years most of the retired power plants have been fossil fuel based.
Upcoming retirements through 2020 are also expected to be mostly coal plants and gas steam turbines
(EIA, 2018). These changes will likely have spatially heterogeneous implications for natural gas and
coal elasticities of substitution, technical efficiency of generation, and CO2 emissions. With greater
elasticity of substitution, a decline in CO2 emissions can be expected. On the other hand, policies or
changes in technology mix that may decrease elasticity of substitution can lead to increase in CO2
emissions. Therefore, policies that may negatively affect elasticities of coal and natural gas substitution
should consider associated increase in CO2 emissions. Policy implications for elasticity of substitution
should also be considered at spatial disaggregated scales as the results document heterogeneous
changes in elasticities of substitution in response to greater availability of natural gas.
Electricity generation sector has adapted to the increased availability of economically
recoverable natural gas reserves, and in April of 2015 for the first time, natural gas based electricity
generation in the US surpassed coal powered electricity generation on a monthly basis (EIA, 2016).
EIA forecasts also indicate that the share of gas-fired electricity generation will continue to rise but
will fluctuate depending on relative fuel prices and infrastructure investments. State level fossil fuel
substitution capabilities in electricity generation are limited due to technologic parameters of power
plants, investment in new gas-fired power plants, and natural gas storage and shipping infrastructure.
Although planned and existing pipeline infrastructure has been found to be adequate for anticipated
needs of electric power sector (DOE, 2015), natural gas storage capacity can still limit the use of
natural gas in electricity generation in some regions. Nevertheless, heterogeneity in fuel substitution
across states, as documented in this study, highlights the need for understanding the implications of
growing natural gas-based electricity generation and declining coal based generation for regional
electric system operations including technical efficiency and CO2 emissions. It is important for policy
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makers and the industry to understand the evolving fuel-substitution capabilities at the state levels to
account for the electric power industry’s ability to respond to changes in the regulatory environment
and relative fuel prices by adjusting fuel mix in electricity generation within and across utilities and
states.
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APPENDIX

Region
MISO
MISO
ISO-NE
ISO-NE
NYISO
NorthWest
PJM
SouthEast
SouthEast
SouthWest
SouthWest
ERCOT

Table 2.A1. Elasticities of Substitution for Coal-Natural Gas (σCN)
2001-2008
2009-2017
Elasticity Change
State
σ1CN
s.e(σ1CN) σ2CN
s.e(σ2CN) σ2CN-σ1CN s.e(σ2CN-σ1CN)
AR
1.59
(0.31)*** 0.71 (0.43)
-0.88
(0.53)
IA
1.46
(0.63)*
0.51 (1.63)
-0.95
(1.75)
CT
1.36
(0.54)**
1.65 (0.46)*** 0.29
(0.71)
MA
-0.03
(0.79)
1.8
(0.32)*** 1.84
(0.85)*
NY
-9.33
(0.71)*** 1.22 (0.42)**
10.56
(0.83)***
NV
-1.34
(0.48)**
1.41 (0.68)*
2.76
(0.83)**
VA
-1.51
(0.62)** -0.56 (1.41)
0.95
(1.54)
AL
0.59
(0.10)*** 0.69 (0.66)
0.10
(0.67)
GA
0.58
(0.23)**
0.90 (1.23)
0.31
(1.25)
AZ
-0.43
(0.14)**
0.49 (0.11)*** 0.92
(0.18)***
NM
0.95
(0.30)**
0.50 (0.24)*
-0.46
(0.39)
TX
2.85
(0.31)*** 0.83 (1.460
-2.02
(1.50)
Standard errors in brackets; Significance levels: 1% ‘***’ 5% ‘**’ 10% ‘*’

Table 2.A2. Own Price Elasticities for Coal (εCC)
2001-2008
2009-2017
Elasticity Change
Region
State ε1CC
s.e(ε1CC) ε2CC s.e(ε2CC)
ε2CC-ε1CC s.e(ε2CC-ε1CC)
MISO
AR
-0.50 (0.12)*** -0.41 (0.24)
0.09
(0.27)
MISO
MS
-0.83 (0.24)** -0.78 (0.47)
0.05
(0.53)
MISO
ND
-0.25 (0.18)
0.88 (0.50)
1.13
(0.53)**
ISO-NE
MA
-0.37 (0.66)
-0.58 (0.23)**
-0.21
(0.70)
NYISO
NY
-0.48 (0.13)*** -0.20 (0.28)
0.28
(0.31)
NorthWest NV
0.02 (0.25)
-1.90 (0.55)**
-1.92
(0.60)**
NorthWest WA
0.15 (0.14)
-0.59 (0.30)*
-0.74
(0.33)**
PJM
VA
-0.84 (0.25)** -0.61 (0.42)
0.23
(0.49)
PJM
WV
-0.43 (0.18)**
0.12 (0.24)
0.55
(0.30)
SouthEast
AL
-0.19 (0.05)*** -0.35 (0.39)
-0.16
(0.39)
SouthWest AZ
-0.19 (0.14)
-0.55 (0.05)*** -0.36
(0.15)**
SouthWest CO
0.01 (0.14)
-0.17 (0.08)*
-0.18
(0.16)
SouthWest NM -0.62 (0.42)
-0.33 (0.15)*
0.29
(0.45)
SPP
SD
-0.75 (0.21)*** 0.21 (1.17)
0.96
(1.19)
ERCOT
TX
-0.13 (0.02)*** -0.31 (0.28)
-0.18
(0.28)
Standard errors in brackets; Significance levels: 1% ‘***’ 5% ‘**’ 10% ‘*’
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Region
MISO
ISO-NE
ISO-NE
ISO-NE
NYISO
NorthWest
PJM
SouthEast
SouthEast
SouthEast
SouthWest
SouthWest
SouthWest
ERCOT

Table 2.A3. Own Price Elasticities for Natural-Gas (εNN)
2001-2008
2009-2017
Elasticity Change
State
ε1NN
s.e(ε1NN)
ε2NN s.e(ε2NN)
ε2NN - ε1NN s.e(ε2NN - ε1NN)
AR
-1.15 (0.19)***
-0.43 (0.25)
0.73
(0.31)*
CT
-0.51 (0.15)**
-0.29 (0.04)***
0.22
(0.16)
MA
-0.29 (0.30)
-0.60 (0.09)***
-0.32
(0.32)
ME
-0.26 (0.23)
-0.51 (0.08)***
-0.25
(0.24)
NY
-2.85 (0.42)***
-0.69 (0.12)***
2.15
(0.44)***
NV
-0.14 (0.31)
-0.73 (0.17)***
-0.59
(0.35)
DE
-0.49 (0.16)**
-0.11 (0.28)
0.38
(0.33)
AL
-0.38 (0.06)***
-0.35 (0.33)
0.04
(0.33)
FL
-0.43 (0.11)***
-0.11 (0.47)
0.33
(0.48)
GA
-0.48 (0.18)**
-0.54 (0.73)
-0.06
(0.75)
AZ
-0.10 (0.03)**
-0.25 (0.05)***
-0.15
(0.06)**
CO
-0.13 (0.06)*
-0.02 (0.14)
0.11
(0.15)
NM
-0.18 (0.04)***
-0.16 (0.08)*
0.02
(0.09)
TX
-2.28 (0.16)***
-0.73 (1.10)
1.55
(1.11)
Standard errors in brackets; Significance levels: 1% ‘***’ 5% ‘**’ 10% ‘*’

Table 2.A4. Cross Price Elasticities for Coal-Natural Gas (εCN)
2001-2008
2009-2017
Elasticity Change
Region
State
ε1CN
s.e(ε1CN)
ε2CN
s.e(ε2CN)
ε2CN- ε1CN s.e(ε2CN- ε1CN)
MISO
AR
0.70 (0.14)***
0.30
(0.18)
-0.40
(0.23)
MISO
IA
0.37 (0.16)**
0.09
(0.29)
-0.28
(0.33)
ISO-NE
CT
0.85 (0.34)**
1.43
(0.40)***
0.58
(0.53)
ISO-NE
MA
-0.02 (0.42)
1.32
(0.23)***
1.33
(0.48)**
NYISO
NY
-1.31 (0.10)***
0.81
(0.28)**
2.12
(0.30)***
NorthWest NV
-0.57 (0.20)**
0.89
(0.43)*
1.46
(0.47)**
PJM
VA
-0.46 (0.19)**
-0.21 (0.53)
0.25
(0.56)
SouthEast AL
0.21 (0.04)***
0.35
(0.33)
0.14
(0.34)
SouthEast GA
0.12 (0.05)**
0.37
(0.51)
0.26
(0.52)
SouthWest AZ
-0.29 (0.09)**
0.26
(0.06)***
0.55
(0.11)***
SouthWest NM
0.75 (0.24)**
0.34
(0.16)*
-0.42
(0.29)
ERCOT
TX
0.18 (0.02)***
0.15
(0.27)
-0.03
(0.27)
Standard errors in brackets; Significance levels: 1% ‘***’ 5% ‘**’ 10% ‘*’
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Table 2.A5. Cross Price Elasticities for Natural Gas-Coal (εNC)
2001-2008
2009-2017
Elasticity Change
Region
State
ε1NC
s.e(ε1NC) ε2NC
s.e(ε2NC) ε2NC- ε1NC s.e(ε2NC- ε1NC)
MISO
AR
0.84 (0.16)*** 0.41 (0.25)
-0.43
(0.30)
MISO
IA
1.05 (0.45)*
0.41 (1.30)
-0.64
(1.38)
ISO-NE
CT
0.22 (0.09)**
0.11 (0.03)*** -0.12
(0.09)
ISO-NE
MA
-0.01 (0.17)
0.35 (0.06)*** 0.36
(0.18)*
NYISO
NY
-2.93 (0.22)*** 0.22 (0.08)**
3.15
(0.24)***
North-West NV
-0.73 (0.26)**
0.51 (0.24)*
1.24
(0.36)**
PJM
VA
-0.82 (0.34)** -0.30 (0.75)
0.53
(0.82)
South-East AL
0.37 (0.06)*** 0.34 (0.32)
-0.04
(0.33)
South-East GA
0.46 (0.18)**
0.52 (0.71)
0.06
(0.73)
South-West AZ
-0.14 (0.05)**
0.22 (0.05)*** 0.36
(0.07)***
South-West NM
0.20 (0.06)**
0.16 (0.08)*
-0.04
(0.10)
ERCOT
TX
2.59 (0.28)*** 0.68 (1.18)
-1.92
(1.22)
Standard errors in brackets; Significance levels: 1% ‘***’ 5% ‘**’ 10% ‘*’
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CHAPTER 3.

All the DUCs in a Row: Natural Gas Production in the US.

Abstract
Using data from seven shale gas regions in the United States, I examine
natural gas production in terms of drilling rig activity and well completion
rates. the objectives are to examine the role and determinants of well
completion decisions in the US natural gas production. I observe that in recent
years, the explanatory power of drilling rig count has declined. On the other
hand, the number of producing wells remain a significant factor in explaining
the variation in gas production. I find that an increase in the number of drilled
but uncompleted wells (DUCs) has a significant role in natural gas supply. The
number of DUCs depends on drilling rig activity and futures prices of oil and
natural gas. Also, the results indicate that well completion decisions and the
duration of DUC status depend on oil and gas prices, pipeline capacity,
producing well type and well depth.

Keywords: Natural Gas Production, Rig Count, Well Completion, Drilled and
Uncompleted Wells.

JEL CLASSIFICATION: L71, Q30, Q41, D22
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3.1 Introduction
Understanding the determinants of natural gas supply is important because of its significance
for the US power sector (Peters and Hertel, 2017; Stephens, 2018) and US economic activity in general
(Arora and Lieskovsky, 2014; Melick, 2014; Weber, 2012; Joskow, 2013)26. Previous academic literature
relied on drilling rig activity (measured in terms of the count of actively drilling rigs) as the primary
determinant of oil and gas production because of the simplicity, availability, and global applicability of
drilling rig count as an indicator (Apergis, Ewing and Payne, 2016; Melek, 2015). The oil and gas
industry also has been relying on rig count as a measure of oil and gas production activity27. However,
as Figure 7 illustrates, natural gas production in the US increased even though drilling activity,
measured in terms of the number of actively drilling rigs, has declined in recent years (EIA, 2019a).
Along with the growth in the use of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling technologies,
market analysts, researchers and government agencies have noted the increase in the inventory of
drilled but uncompleted wells (DUCs) in the US (Hegarty, 2017; EIA 2013; EIA 2019b; Dunning,
2016; Srinivasan, Krishnamurthy and Kaufman, 2019; IHS, 2016; Piotrowski, 2016). However, little
or no systematic information is available on the growth of DUC inventory and the implications for
natural gas production. This paper examines the determinants of DUC inventories and the impacts of
drilling rig activity and well completion on natural gas output in the US.
Technological developments in unconventional oil and gas (UOG) production have
transformed the US gas industry. According to the US EIA, domestic production of gas from the
UOG industry grew by more than 100 % from 2000 to 2010. Data from the EIA (2016a) also indicate
that daily production of US dry shale increased from 2.5 in 2002 to 43 billion cubic feet in 2016, with

26
27

Large number of studies also document the relationship between energy in general and economic growth (See Hamilton, 2013).
For example, Baker Hughes has been reporting rig count since 1944 (Baker Hughes, 2019).
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most of the new production coming from the Northern Appalachian basin (Marcellus and Utica shale
units). Substantial gains in productivity continue through advances such as super pads (which can
include up to 20 wells), extended horizontal laterals (reaching up to 20 thousand feet28) and improved
drilling and fracturing technologies. The share of horizontally drilled wells increased from 3% in 2008
to 12% in 2017 (EIA 2018). As a result, although the number of drilling rigs fell since 2014, natural
gas production has continued to grow (Figure 7) (EIA, 2019a).
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Figure 7: US rig activity and natural gas production
In general, UOG production involves two stages. The first stage involves drilling, casing the
well with multiple strings of steel pipe, and cementing the pipe. In the second stage (completion), the
steel casing is perforated, and the well is stimulated via hydraulic fracturing to initiate gas flow from
fractured formations. Completion, which can be significantly more expensive and time consuming
than the first stage activities, can be delayed indefinitely. However, interrupting the flow from a
producing well can be prohibitively costly in terms of foregone income (Kleinberg et al., 2018). Hence,
production timing decisions take the form of drilling and completion decisions corresponding to

28

See Eclipse Purple Hayes well at 20,803 feet.
https://www.hartenergy.com/exclusives/super-laterals-going-really-really-long-appalachia-31209
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stages one and two, respectively (Mason and Roberts, 2018). Wells drilled (stage one), but not
hydraulically fractured or completed are labeled as drilled but uncompleted wells (DUCs).
Figure 8 shows that the aggregate number of DUCs has increased since 2007 across all regions.
From November 2016 to the end of 2017, the number of DUCs rose 37.4% to 7,493 (DI, 2016).
EIA’s (2019a) drilling productivity report shows more than 8,700 DUCs as of November 2018.
Growth in DUCs varies by region, with the largest increase observed in the Permian Basin. The
reasons for the delays in well completion, and consequent growth in the DUC numbers, may include:
shortage of hydraulic fracturing equipment and teams, contractual lease obligations that require active
well development in stage one, pipeline capacity bottlenecks, and operators’ timing decisions to take
advantage of favorable prices (EIA, 2019b; Kleinberg et al., 2018).
One implication of the increase in DUCs is that aggregate natural gas production depends less
on drilling rig activity and more on well completion rates. As a result of growth in unconventional
production, and associated two-stage production technology use, drilling rig counts no longer directly
correspond to the number of producing wells. Hence, the number of completed wells may be
increasingly important for modeling natural gas production. Though the drilling rig count remains an
important factor in natural gas production, increase in production is achieved with fewer drilling rigs
given improvements in drilling technology and the backlog of DUCs (EIA, 2019a)
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Figure 8. Rig count, drilled and un-completed well count, and natural gas production trends from 2007-2018
Importantly, for overall production to grow, the productivity of new wells must offset declines in
productivity of legacy wells (Boyce and Nøstbakken, 2011). Therefore, this paper considers both the
number of producing wells and the number of newly completed wells as drivers of natural gas output.
The objectives of this study are threefold. First, I examine the role of well completion rates in
explaining natural gas production. Second, I examine the determinants of DUC numbers, which
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represent the gap between drilled and completed wells. Third, I identify the factors that influence the
length of time that operators take to complete unconventional wells.
The literature on the determinants of natural gas production is limited. Iledare (1995) uses a
supply model for natural gas reserve additions in West Virginia to study the responsiveness of drilling
effort and gross reserve additions to changes in the expected wellhead price, taxes, resource depletion
and reserve life index. He concludes that drilling activity shifts across geological formations in
response to varying geologic conditions and economic incentives. Boyce and Nøstbakken (2011) show
a positive correlation between output prices and drilled wells, enabled by a significant decrease in the
cost of drilling. Chen and Linn (2017) examine the effects of oil and gas futures prices on drilling
activity in the US and the rest of the world. They show that drilling activities respond to futures prices
more than spot prices. This is consistent with the industry practice of hedging gas production. Gülen
et al., (2013) also document the sensitivity of drilling new wells to changes in natural gas prices. Similar
results with a positive association between oil rig activity and crude oil prices have been documented
by Ringlund, Rosendahl and Skjerpen (2008), Apergis et al. (2016), Anderson, Kellogg, and Salant
(2018) and Khalifa, Caporin and Hammoudeh (2017).
Mason and Roberts (2018) examine the sensitivity of well level natural gas production in
Wyoming to geologic and economic factors. They show that geologic factors affect intra-well
production variation (well productivity) while prices affect inter-well production changes (number of
producing wells) via producer drilling decisions. They conclude that after a well has started producing,
prices have limited effect on well-level production. Instead, geologic and engineering factors
determine well productivity. However, prices have a significant effect on total supply due to the
elasticity of producers’ drilling decisions. The authors show that at lower prices, only the most
productive wells are drilled, while higher prices enable drilling of less productive wells. They also
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observe that the elasticity of drilling decisions in Wyoming increased since the use of horizontal drilling
and hydraulic fracturing technologies. Ikonnikova and Gulen (2015) also examine the effect of prices
on drilling activities in Barnett, Haynesville, and Fayetteville shale units. They show that at lower
prices, producers in some locations may find it more profitable to rely on low-cost infill29 wells to
minimize capital costs as opposed to drilling relatively more productive but costlier wells in new
locations.
None of the previous studies examine growth in DUC numbers and the relationships between
gas production, drilling rig activity and well completion across shale regions in the US. I disentangle
these variables, which allows us to present a more nuanced account of production activities given the
recent growth in the number of drilled but uncompleted wells. the results document greater
explanatory power of the number of producing wells relative to the count of active rigs for modeling
natural gas production30. I also show that changes in oil and gas futures prices and drilling rig activity
affect DUC numbers and the length of time that operators take to complete individual drilled wells.
3.2 Data
Unconventional shale gas production makes up more than 50% of all-natural gas produced in
the US and its contribution continues to increase with most of the production coming from seven
major shale regions (EIA, 2017). This study is based on the data from Anadarko, Appalachia
(Marcellus and Utica), Bakken, Eagle Ford, Haynesville, Niobrara and Permian regions.

Infill wells are drilled and completed next to existing wells as opposed to new locations. Infill wells are less productive
but require lower upfront capital costs by taking advantage of existing infrastructure and existing lease arrangements.
30Although the principles addressed in this study are applicable to both oil and gas production, I focus the analysis on
unconventional gas production and reserve the analysis of oil production to future studies. I acknowledge that in some
cases oil and gas production is joint. For example, unconventional production in the Permian basin is primarily aimed at
oil with associated gas production.
29
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I use monthly regional data from January 2007 to July 2018 to examine cumulative natural gas
production and DUC counts, and daily well level data from 2000 to 2018 to estimate hazard ratios31.
The data summary is presented in Table 9. Rig count and natural gas production32 (million cubic feet
- mmcf) data are obtained from the EIA. Well completion data obtained from DrillingInfo (now
Enverus) include a monthly cumulative number of producing wells. Rig count data (disregarding the
differences in rig requirements across regions due to geological characteristics) are provided by Baker
Hughes.
Rig activity in this study reflects only the number of actively33 drilling rigs. Figure 8 presents
data trends for drilling rig counts, DUCs, and gas production. Since 2007, natural gas production has
been increasing significantly in most regions, except in Niobrara and Haynesville. Substantial increase
in production can be attributed to significant gains in productivity enabled by recent technological
improvements. Haynesville lies deeper than the shale reservoirs in other regions making supply
sensitive to price variation. Drilling rig activity in this region went down significantly and in 2016
drilling rig count dropped to 20 rigs.
To examine the growth in the number of DUCs, I use estimated monthly count of DUCs
from January 2007 to July 201834. Figure 8 shows that the numbers of DUCs have been increasing

31Natural

gas production and DUC count analysis covers 2007 to 2018 because EIA data on monthly rig count and
production per region are available only starting from January 2007. I used an expanded sample time frame in the survival
analysis from January 2000 to July 2018 based on DUC duration data availability.
32EIA estimates natural gas production using data reported by various industry sources. In this study, I use up to date
natural gas production numbers as reported by the EIA.
33The rig is active if it is drilling at least 15 days during the month. This measure excludes rigs involved in non-drilling
activities like workovers and production testing. This definition is consistent with EIA (2019a) and Baker Hughes (2019).
34Estimates of DUC numbers can vary depending on methodologies, assumptions, and availability of data. EIA counts a
drilled well to be uncompleted after 20 days’ post spudding (EIA, 2016b). EIA started providing DUC count as of
December 2013. To increase the sample size, I estimate DUCs using DrillingInfo well level data from January 2000 to July
2018 following the EIA methodology. Comparison of EIA DUC data and the estimated DUC numbers after 2013 reveals
insignificant mean difference at 5% significance level in most regions except Appalachia and Permian. In these regions,
the difference is insignificant at 1% level. The comparisons are available upon request. The minor difference in some
regions can be due to the estimation method. the computations account for DUCs drilled since 2000. On the other hand,
EIA excludes wells drilled prior to December 2013.
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since 2007, with greater increases observed in Permian, Niobrara, and Anadarko regions. However, in
Appalachia and Eagle Ford regions, the numbers of DUCs have decreased since 2014. The declines
in the numbers of DUCs in Appalachia and Eagle Ford imply that completion of previously drilled
but uncompleted wells has been outpacing drilling of new wells.

Table 9: Descriptive Statistics
Region
Variable
All Regions N.Gas Future Price ($/mcf)**
Oil Future Price ($/b)**
Anadarko
Pipeline Capacity (103 mmcfd)**
N.Gas
Production
(103
mmcf)/month*
Rig Count/month*
DUC Well Count 103/month*
Producing Well Count 103/month*
DUC Duration35 (Days)**
UOG Well Measured Depth36
(103Ft)**
Appalachia Pipeline Capacity (103 mmcfd)**
N.Gas
Production
(103
mmcf)/month*
Rig Count/month*
DUC Well Count 103/month*
Producing Well Count 103/month*
DUC Duration (Days)**
UOG Well Measured Depth
(103Ft)**
Bakken
Pipeline Capacity (103 mmcfd)**
N.Gas
Production
(103
mmcf)/month*
Rig Count/month*
DUC Well Count 103/month*
Producing Well Count 103/month*
DUC Duration (Days)**
UOG Well Measured Depth
(103Ft)**

N.

Mean

Min.

Max.

4.91
62.41
16.3
5.1

Std.
Dev.
2.29
27.20
2.7
0.8

6,787
6,787
139
139

1.35
14.06
13.3
3.9

14.74
145.90
19.3
7.0

139
139
139
14,840
14,781

155
1.1
16.2
88
13.4

55
0.4
2.7
121
3.8

55
0.4
9.8
1
0.1

247
1.7
19.7
1,778
38.9

139
139

40.1
11.2

11.1
9.1

29.7
1.3

59.8
28.7

139
139
139
14,649
14,529

90
1.1
47.6
317
12.6

33
0.7
7.2
249
3.8

36
0.01
20.5
1
0.04

154
2.0
54.9
1821
40.0

139
139

7.7
0.9

0.4
0.7

7.2
0.2

8.1
2.4

139
139
139
15,738
15,705

105
0.9
6.2
142
18.8

64
0.5
4.7
153
3.4

24
0.2
0.5
1
1.9

218
1.7
13.2
1656
27.2

DUC duration variable measures length of time in days from end of drilling (spud date plus 20 days) to well completion
or to first production for only completed unconventional wells. Minimum DUC duration of 1 day indicates that every
region has at least 1 well which was completed in 21 days after spudding. Maximum DUC duration reflects maximum
duration before the DUC well is treated as “dead”. For the purpose of this study, outlier wells (wells drilled and not
completed within the period of 5 years) are treated as “dead” DUCs and they constitute about 0.3% of the data.
36
Well measured depth is the borehole and horizontal length of unconventional wells (horizontal and directional).
35
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Pipeline Capacity (103 mmcfd)**
139
3
N.Gas
Production
(10 139
mmcf)/month*
Rig Count/month*
139
3
DUC Well Count 10 /month*
139
Producing Well Count 103/month* 139
DUC Duration (Days)**
25,230
UOG Well Measured Depth
25,225
(103Ft)**
Haynesville Pipeline Capacity (103 mmcfd)**
139
N.Gas
Production
(103 139
mmcf)/month*
Rig Count/month*
139
DUC Well Count 103/month*
139
3
Producing Well Count 10 /month* 139
DUC Duration (Days)**
7,965
UOG Well Measured Depth
7,949
3
(10 Ft)**
Niobrara
Pipeline Capacity (103 mmcfd)**
139
3
N.Gas
Production
(10 139
mmcf)/month*
Continued…
Rig Count/month*
139
3
DUC Well Count 10 /month*
139
Producing Well Count 103/month* 139
DUC Duration (Days)**
11,872
UOG Well Measured Depth
11,373
(103Ft)**
Permian
Pipeline Capacity (103 mmcfd)**
139
N.Gas
Production
(103 139
mmcf)/month*
Rig Count/month*
139
DUC Well Count 103/month*
139
3
Producing Well Count 10 /month* 139
DUC Duration (Days)**
36,513
UOG Well Measured Depth
36,486
3
(10 Ft)**
Note: **Data is from 2000- 2018 and *data is from 2007-2018.
Eagle Ford

5.5
4.2

1.5
2.2

3.7
1.5

7.8
7.4

134
1.3
7.4
149
14.9

87
0.6
2.9
204
3.2

30
0.3
3.0
1
0.4

279
2.4
11.6
1,821
39.4

38.4
6.7

6.0
1.9

30.4
3.6

46.8
10.6

104
0.6
15.7
116
14.9

73
0.2
3.0
137
3.6

16
0.4
8.1
1
1.1

244
1.0
18.7
1,728
39.9

21.2
4.5

6.4
0.3

10.6
3.4

27.3
5.1

72
0.5
2.5
133
11.5

30
0.2
0.7
150
3.6

16
0.2
1.2
1
0.4

127
0.9
3.3
1,821
40.0

16.6
5.7

2.5
1.7

13.3
3.8

20.2
1.0

335
2.5
109.3
132
13.1

132
0.8
21.8
182
4.1

92
0.4
30.4
1
0.4

565
4.3
136.9
1,822
40.0

To explain the variation across regions and over time, I control for pipeline capacity, drilling
rig count, and futures prices of natural gas (measured in dollars per thousand cubic feet) and oil
(measured in dollars per barrel). Following Chen and Linn (2017), I compute average futures prices
of natural gas and oil using all available, 𝑚, futures contracts from the trading floor of the New York
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Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). I define futures price (𝐹𝑡 ) at time t as a function of the contract
1

prices such that 𝐹𝑡 = 𝑛 (∑𝑛𝑚=1 𝐶𝑡,𝑚 ), where 𝐶𝑡,𝑚 denotes the price of the m-th contract at time t.
Contract prices and natural gas pipeline capacity data are obtained from the EIA. Pipeline capacity
measures outflow volume of pipeline infrastructure expressed in million cubic feet per day (mmcf/d).
Table 9 indicates that pipeline capacity increased the most in the Appalachian region with more than
30,000 mmcf added between 2007 to 2018. On the other hand, Bakken experienced the least
expansion in pipeline capacity with less than 1000mmcf added over the same period. In Eagle Ford,
Niobrara, Haynesville, Anadarko and Permian capacities increased by 4,141mmcf, 16,708mmcf,
16,386mmcf, 5,968mmcf and 6,920mmcf respectively.
In the time-to-event (survival) analysis of DUC duration status, I use individual well level data
from January 2000 to July 2018. DUC duration status for an individual unconventional well is the
number of days between the end of stage one37 and completion or beginning of gas production.
Completion date in the analysis is the earliest of the reported well completion date or the date of first
reported production38. Summary statistics of DUC duration are presented in Table 9.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy includes: a) the analysis of natural gas production in terms of drilling
rig counts and producing wells using linear fixed effects and vector autoregressive models, b) the
analysis of DUC counts within and across regions using linear fixed effects regressions, and c) the
analysis of individual DUC duration status using survival analysis technique.

37

Following EIA methodology, I assume that stage one takes 20 days on average.
Many wells are completed/fractured more than once, and the data do not indicate whether a specific completion date corresponds to first
completion or a recompletion. Therefore, I use the earlier of the first production or completion dates to avoid re-completion entries.
38
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3.3.1. Natural gas production
I first use a linear regression model in double log form to explore the effect of (lagged) rig
count (RC) and producing wells (PW) on natural gas production (NGP) individually and in
combination. Next, I estimate autoregressive models as a robustness check. I test for unit roots using
Phillips-Perron (Phillips and Perron, 1988), Augmented Dickey-Fuller (Dickey and Fuller, 1981) and
panel Levin-Lin-Chu (Levin, et al., 2002) statistics. Subsequently, I conduct a panel cointegration
analysis to determine the long-run relationship between natural gas production, rig count, and the
number of producing wells39. The Pedroni’s heterogeneous panel cointegration test is used to test for
the group and bivariate cointegration relationships. I compute four panel and three group statistics
following Neal (2014) based on the ‘within’ and the ‘between’ dimensions respectively (Pedroni 1999,
2004). I also test for cointegration within each region using the Johansen test (Johansen, 1988, 1995a,
b). I proceed with estimating a panel VAR with generalized methods of moments (Abrigo and Love,
2016). Next, I estimate each region’s VEC (vector error correction) model to account for cointegration
within regions (Engle and Granger, 1987). The VEC model is specified as follows:
𝛥𝑌𝑘𝑡 = 𝛼𝑘 + 𝛿𝜂𝑘𝑡−1 + ∑𝑝𝑖=1 𝛽𝑘𝑖 𝛥𝑌𝑘𝑡−𝑖 +
+ ∑𝑝𝑖=1 𝛷1𝑘𝑖 𝛥𝑋1𝑘𝑡−𝑖 +. . + ∑𝑝𝑖=1 𝛷𝑗𝑘𝑖 𝛥𝑋𝑗𝑘𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑘𝑡

(3.1)

where Δ is the first difference operator; 𝒀𝒌𝒕 is natural gas production in log form in each region k at
period t; 𝑿𝒋 is the j-th explanatory variable in log form; 𝜼 are the residuals from the cointegration
vector; p is the optimal lag length; 𝜶𝒌 is the intercept, and 𝜺𝒕 is the error term.

39

Following Liew (2004), Hannan-Quinn criterion (HQC) (Hannan and Quinn 1979) is used to determine the appropriate lag length for each
series in each region.
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3.3.2. DUC Counts
To examine the growth in the number of DUCs, I use regional fixed effects regression models
in log-log form with and without time fixed effects40, with first differences, and standardized variables.
The independent variables include pipeline capacity, drilling rig count, natural gas and oil futures
prices. Futures prices (FP) rather than spot prices are used following Chen and Linn (2017) who
showed that futures prices have a more significant effect on natural gas production than spot prices.
The futures prices (FP) are lagged to account for the time that it takes the operators to initiate
production in response to price movements (Osmundsen et al., 2015). I use standardized variables
obtained by subtracting the mean (across regions and within regions) and pipeline capacity expressed
in first difference to estimate the fixed effects regression model41. Standardization approach reduces
the scale of variables but preserves the interpretation of the regression coefficients to represent the
mean change in the DUC given a unit change in the independent variable.
3.3.3. DUC Status Duration
In this analysis, I am interested in examining the factors that influence the length of time that
operators take to complete the drilled wells. Time to event (duration/survival) analysis (see Sy and
Taylor, 2000; Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2001; Fleming and Harrington 2011; Hernandez and
Dresdner, 2010) is used to analyze DUC duration data. I define a random variable T with a continuous
probability distribution function 𝑓(𝑡) to represent DUC duration, or the number of days from the
end of drilling to completion. The probability that a drilled well is completed in t days is given by
𝐹(𝑡) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑇 < 𝑡). Correspondingly, the survival function, or the probability of a drilled well not
being completed in t days, is 𝑆(𝑡) = 1 − 𝐹(𝑡). The hazard rate (𝜆(𝑡) = 𝑓(𝑡)/𝑆(𝑡)), is the probability
that a drilled well will be completed at time, t, given that it was not completed prior to t. I use semi-

40

Hausman test (Chi2(5) =78.04; Prob>Chi2=0.00) indicted superiority of Fixed Effects regression over a Random Effects model. Joint F test results
(F (135, 820) =1.92 Prob>F=0.00) suggest including time fixed effects.
41
After standardization all VIFs were less than 5 with mean of 2.81 (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black, 1995).
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parametric42 Cox proportional hazard model (equation (3.2)) (Cox, 1972) to represent the hazard
function in the DUC duration analysis (Stogiannis et al. 2011).
𝜆(𝑡|𝑥, 𝜷) = 𝜆0 (𝑡)𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝑿′ β)

(3.2)

where 𝛽 is a vector of unknown parameters of 𝑋 covariates, 𝜆0 (𝑡) is the baseline hazard function
when 𝜆(𝑡|𝑥 = 0) = 𝜆0 (𝑡) and can take any form as a function of t. The effects of covariates can be
represented in various specifications of the hazard function.

3.4 Results
I start with examining the difference in the relationship between natural gas production and
rig count (RC) before and after February 200943. In addition to the expansion in unconventional gas
production, this breakpoint is also close to the economic downturn and to the beginning of the new
US administration. Each of these factors could have contributed to the structural break timing.
Nevertheless, I believe that the breakpoint adequately reflects the changes in natural gas production
series and enables meaningful comparison of production pre and post 2009.
Table 10: Split Sample Regional Fixed Effects Results for Aggregate NGP
Dependent – NGP
Before Feb 2009
After Feb 2009
Rig Countt-1
0.212 (0.04)***
-0.048 (0.03)
Constant
13.55 (0.17)***
15.54 (0.15)***
R-sq
0.17
0.010
Observations
n=7, T=25, N=175
n=7, T=113, N=791
Note: Significance values 1%***, 5%**, 10%*; Standard Errors in Brackets

42

I also estimate parametric specifications including exponential, Weibull and Gompertz functions. These results are available on request.
I test for the presence of a structural break using Wald-type tests (Vogelsang, 1997; Andrews 1993; Andrews and Ploberger 1994) in the linear
regression of natural gas production (NGP) and rig count (RC). I estimate a linear regression model and compute the S-wald test statistic for an
unknown break. I also used this method to identify the breaks (Bi) for each region independently. The results show May 2010 for Anadarko, August
2012 for Appalachia, December 2012 for Bakken, February 2013 for Eagle Ford, February 2009 for Haynesville and January 2014 for Niobrara
and Permian.
43
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The results from regional fixed effects regression models with lagged RC are presented in
Table 10. These results show a significant change in the explanatory power of lagged RC for natural
gas production (NGP). The rig count is positively correlated with natural gas production prior to
February 2009. However, after February 2009 RC has a statistically insignificant relationship with
natural gas production and a weaker explanatory power. A similar loss of explanatory power of RC is
found with heterogeneous break point dates across regions (see Table 3.A1 in the Appendix).
3.4.1. Determinants of Natural Gas Production (NGP)
Table 11 shows regression results with region fixed effects and logged NGP as the dependent
variable. Three model results are presented. R-squared values show that Models 2 and 3, which include
producing wells (PW) explain more of the variation in NGP than Model 1 (with only RC). The
marginal contribution of producing wells as an explanatory variable relative to the rig count is
significant, as revealed by the difference in R-squared values between Models 1 and 2. Comparison of
Models 2 and 3 illustrates that although rig count is statistically significant and remains to be a
meaningful determinant of NGP, its marginal contribution to explaining variation in natural gas
production is smaller relative to the number of producing wells. These results are robust under
heterogeneous break period specification across producing regions (see Appendix Table 3.A2).
Table 11: Region and Time Fixed Effects Regression Results for Aggregate NGP
NGP-Dep
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Rig Countt-1
0.332 (0.03)***
0.274 (0.03)***
Producing Wells
0.524 (0.04)***
0.468 (0.03)***
Feb 2009
1.413 (0.22)*** 1.044 (0.22)***
1.093 (0.21)***
Constant
12.94 (0.22)*** 9.906 (0.41)***
9.132 (0.41)***
R-sq
0.58
0.61
0.64
Observations
Balanced Panel n=7, T=138, N=966
Note: Significance values 1%***, 5%**, 10%*; Standard errors in brackets; Data from 2007-2018
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To explore the relationship at the regional scale, I estimate Models 1, 2 and 3 for each region
individually. The results presented in Table 12 are consistent with the results in Table 11, with all but
two of the regions showing statistically significant effects of producing wells (PW).
Table 12: Regional Regression Results (Determinants of NGP)
Region
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Anadarko
Rig Countt-1
-0.003 (0.03)
0.002 (0.02)
Producing Wells
0.894 (0.07)***
0.908 (0.07)***
Feb 2009
0.202 (0.03)***
-0.126 (0.03)***
-0.126 (0.03)***
Adj R-sq
0.230
0.633
0.630
Appalachia
Rig Countt-1
-0.663 (0.19)***
-0.521 (0.16)***
Producing Wells
3.978 (0.50)***
3.874 (0.49)***
Feb 2009
2.222 (0.20)***
0.596 (0.22)***
0.915 (0.24)***
Adj R-sq
0.482
0.621
0.642
Bakken
Rig Countt-1
-0.264 (0.09)***
-0.083 (0.03)**
Producing Wells
0.896 (0.03)***
0.884 (0.03)***
Feb 2009
1.571 (0.15)***
-0.318 (0.08)***
-0.245 (0.09)***
Adj R-sq
0.436
0.916
0.919
Eagle Ford
Rig Countt-1
0.152 (0.06)**
0.153 (0.02)***
Producing Wells
1.525 (0.05)***
1.530 (0.04)***
Feb 2009
0.838 (0.12)***
-0.235 (0.05)***
-0.337 (0.04)***
Adj R-sq
0.379
0.931
0.937
Haynesville
Rig Countt-1
0.077 (0.02)***
0.160 (0.03)***
Producing Wells
0.177 (0.14)
0.771 (0.17)***
Feb 2009
0.653 (0.05)***
0.490 (0.08)***
0.391 (0.07)***
Adj R-sq
0.587
0.571
0.638
Niobrara
Rig Countt-1
0.011 (0.01)
0.010 (0.02)
Producing Wells
-0.023 (0.03)
-0.028 (0.03)
Feb 2009
0.122 (0.02)***
0.136 (0.02)
0.138 (0.02)***
Adj R-sq
0.363
0.382
0.203
Permian
Rig Countt-1
-0.006 (0.05)
-0.121 (0.04)***
Producing Wells
1.255 (0.12)***
1.390 (0.13)***
Feb 2009
0.172 (0.06)***
-0.387 (0.07)***
-0.408 (0.07)***
Adj R-sq
0.051
0.457
0.497
Note: Significance values 1%***, 5%**, 10%*; Standard errors in brackets; Data from 2007-2018
In some of the regions, rig count has a negative coefficient as natural gas production increased

88
despite the declining number of active rigs. The estimated adjusted R-squared varies among regions
and between models. However, in all cases, Models 2 and 3, which include the number of producing
wells, show better fits compared to Model 1. The rig count is a significant indicator for natural gas
production in some regions. However, in most regions the rig count is not as informative as the
number of producing wells, which accounts for well completions. Similar conclusions are reached in
the models with heterogeneous break points across regions (see Table 3.A3 in the Appendix).

In Table 13, I show the results from the regression where new wells are separated from older
(legacy) wells. In this model, new wells represent cumulative number of wells that started producing
up to three months ago. New well completions reflect the effect of higher initial productivity of new
wells and have a statistically significant effect44. The new wells contribute to total gas production only
after completion, which can be delayed indefinitely after drilling. The delays in completion weaken the
correspondence between drilling rates and aggregate gas production. Hence, well completion decisions
have a significant impact on aggregate natural gas production following the growth in UOG
production. The conclusions are robust with heterogeneous breakpoints across regions (see Table
3.A4 in the Appendix).
Table 13: Regional and Time Fixed Effects Regression Results (NGP and New Wells)
Dependent – ΔNGP
Log-log form
Legacy Wells
New Wells
Feb 2009
Constant
R-sq

-0.012 (0.00)***
0.009 (0.00)***
0.042 (0.02)***
0.070 (0.03)**
0.26

Note: Significance values 1%***, 5%**, 10%*; Standard errors in brackets

44

I also estimated the model where new wells include those that have started producing longer than three months ago. The results, available upon
request, confirm declining productivity after approximately a year.
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Next, I turn to the panel vector autoregressive models. First, I perform several diagnostic tests.
Unit root tests indicate that all variables are non-stationary in levels at the regional and aggregate scales.
However, I reject the null hypothesis that the differenced variables contain a unit root at 1%
significance level (see Table 3.A5 in the Appendix for the first-differenced variables, with and without
a trend). I use a lag length of four as determined by HQC test (see Table 3.A6 in the Appendix) in
estimating the autoregressive models. The Pedroni’s heterogeneous panel cointegration test is used to
determine the long-run relationships between variables (see Table 3.A7 in the Appendix), and indicates
that panel rho-statistic, panel PP statistic, group rho-statistics and group PP-statistics fail to reject the
null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 0.1 significance level45. However, panel ADF t-statistic and
group ADF-statistics reject the null hypothesis at the 0.05 significance level. Conversely, the Johansen
test for cointegration (Johansen, 1988, 1995a, b) reveals cointegration within regions between some
of the variables in the specifications (see Appendix Table 3.A8). Therefore, I reject the null of zero
co-integrating vectors within regions using the trace statistic and conclude that there is at least one cointegrating vector in the specifications, which include natural gas production (NGP), rig count (RC)
and producing wells (PW).
The results for the panel vector autoregressive models with regional fixed effects are presented
in the Appendix (see Table 3.A9). The rig count is statistically not significant in the first three models.
On the other hand, the lagged number of producing wells is significant. I also estimate the Vector
Error Correction model with NGP as a function of RC and PW for each region. Results are presented
in the Appendix section (see Table 3.A10). The rig count has a statistically insignificant effect in three
of the seven regions. In Bakken, Eagle Ford, Niobrara and Permian regions, the rig count has a

45

The panel VEC estimation follows two steps. First is the estimation of long run relationship using the following model, 𝑌𝑘,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑘 + 𝛿𝑘 𝑡 +
∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝛽𝑖 𝑋𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑘𝑡 , to obtain the estimated residuals 𝜀𝑘𝑡 which form the error correction term in the panel VEC model (see Jiang and Liu, 2014).
In the second step, equation 1 is estimated as a panel VAR with the error correction term.
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negative and significant coefficient indicating growth in natural gas production despite a declining
number of active rigs. This is consistent with the previous results and with the report by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas (2019). These results suggest that well productivity and the number of
producing wells, which depends on well completion rates, are important determinants of natural gas
production.
Overall, the results show that there is a significant relationship between the cumulative number
of producing wells and natural gas production. However, the strength of the relationship differs across
regions. In comparison, the drilling rig count is statistically weaker in explaining natural gas
production. Delays in unconventional well completions, and growth in the number of DUCs, have
introduced an additional layer of disparity between drilling rig count and natural gas production. I
examine the determinants of the number of DUCs in the next section.
3.4.2. DUCs Analysis
Region and time fixed effects models are used to examine the number of DUCs as a function
of pipeline capacity (Cap), rig count (RC), and natural gas and oil futures prices (FP). The results in
Table 14 are consistent with expectations. I observe that futures prices of natural gas and oil have
statistically significant and negative effects on the number of DUC numbers. When futures prices are
high, more wells are completed, and DUC numbers decline. This result is consistent with operators
selling at favorable prices to cover well completion costs by taking advantage of high initial well
production rates. With futures and forward contracts locked in, the operators attract investors to front
the money needed for well completion. This result supports the insight that operators defer well
completions, leading to high DUC numbers, in anticipation of better oil and natural gas prices
(Andrien, 2016; Kleinberg, 2018).
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Table 14: Drilled and Un-Completed Well Analysis Regional Regression Results
Region
Region and Time
Fixed Effects
Fixed Effects
DUC - dependent
A. Log-log
B. Log-log
C. Variables
D. Variables
standardized across standardized by
regions
region
Pipeline Capacity
1.668 (0.86)
0.329 (0.17)
0.232 (0.24)
ΔPipeline Capacity 2.274 (1.73)
Rig Countt-1
0.448 (0.10)***
0.585 (0.14)*** 0.485 (0.11)***
0.412 (0.09)***
NG Future Price
-0.213 (0.14)
-2.337 (0.69)**
-0.636 (0.16)***
-1.493 (0.73)*
Oil Future Price
-0.031 (0.15)
-4.112 (1.01)*** -0.765 (0.16)***
-1.841 (0.86)*
Time
0.007 (0.00)**
Constant
-11.75 (8.71)
24.34 (4.48)*** -0.218 (0.13)
-1.008 (0.39)**
Adj R-sq
0.717
0.735
0.792
0.721
Observations
966
966
966
966
Note: Significance values 1%***, 5%**, 10%*; Robust standard errors in brackets; Data from 2007-2018
Region fixed effects regression results show that pipeline infrastructure is not a statistically
significant factor in explaining DUC numbers46. Statistical insignificance of pipeline capacity in these
models can be due to a lack of variability in pipeline capacity within each region over time. The
individual region results in Table 15 confirm the results from the aggregate analysis.
Table 15: OLS Log-log Regression Results for DUC Well Analysis per Region
Dep- DUC counts Anadarko Appalachia Bakken Eagle Ford Haynesville Niobrara
ΔPipeline Capacity -0.832
0.767
-0.861
-0.544
0.374
-0.081
(0.35)
(2.00)
(1.45)
(1.47)
(1.17)
(0.26)
Rig Countt-1
0.281*** 0.462*
0.278 *** 0.510 *** 0.247*** 0.180***
(0.07)
(0.24)
(0.07)
(0.05)
(0.02)
(0.05)
NG Future Price -1.089*** -2.949*** -1.363*** -0.934*** -0.666 *** -0.262***
(0.08)
(0.31)
(0.12)
(0.10)
(0.06)
(0.07)
Oil Future Price
0.079
0.646
0.158
-0.121
-0.295*** -0.234 ***
(0.10)
(0.41)
(0.17)
(0.12)
(0.05)
(0.08)
Constant
6.735*** 5.747***
6.624*** 6.442*** 5.035*** 8.302***
(0.35)
(0.89)
(0.46)
(0.35)
(0.18)
(0.27)
R-sq
0.740
0.747
0.728
0.831
0.634
0.532
Observations
138
138
138
138
138
138
Note: Significance values 1%***, 5%**, 10%*; Standard errors in brackets; Data from 2007-2018

46

Permian
-0.781
(1.95)
0.354 ***
(0.03)
-0.391***
(0.06)
-0.382***
(0.08)
7.937 ***
(0.23)
0.720
138

I also estimated a regional and time fixed effects regression model using first differences of the explanatory variables. The results show significant
negative effect of oil and gas futures prices on DUC growth. However, pipeline capacity and drilling activity are not significant. These results are
available on request.
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Table 15 show that rig count and futures prices have positive and negative effects on DUC
numbers, respectively. The results also show that, as one would expect, an increase in drilling activity,
measured in terms of the number of active drilling rigs, has a statistically significant and positive effect
on the number of DUCs. All else constant, greater drilling activities lead to a greater number of DUCs.
3.4.3. DUC Status Duration Analysis
Next, I examine the length of time that operators take to complete each unconventional well.
I use the well level DUC duration status data to examine completion timing. Non-parametric survival
functions are presented in Figure 9 using data from 2000 to 2018. The Kaplan-Meier survival curves
show the proportion of wells that remain uncompleted over time. Most wells (about 90%) are
completed within a year. An insignificant number of outlier DUCs (about 0.3%) remain uncompleted
after five years. In this study, such wells are treated as “dead”47 DUCs and are excluded from the
regression analyses.

0.50
0.00

0.25

% Survival

0.75

1.00

Kaplan Meier Survival Estimates

0

500
Analysis Time (Number of Days)
Anadarko
Bakken
Haynesville
Permian

1000

Appalachia
Eagle Ford
Niobrara

Figure 9: Kaplan-Meier survival curves

Example of such definition can be found in Andrien (2016) where “dead” DUCs are defined as wells which fail to be completed even at better
oil and gas prices.
47
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I use linear regression and time-to-event (survival) models to obtain statistical estimates for
the factors that explain the length of time taken to complete drilled wells. The generalized linear model
is used to illustrate the general baseline relationship between DUC duration and the explanatory
variables. However, survival analysis is more appropriate to represent the duration data adequately
and to provide a more detailed account using both the survival and hazard functions. The survival
function represents the probability that a well remains uncompleted at any given time, while the hazard
function gives the probability that a well will be completed in a given period assuming that it has not
yet been completed.
The Results for the generalized linear (column A) and semi-parametric Cox proportional
(columns B and C) models with logged days of DUC duration status are presented in Table 16. Cross
region variation is captured using dummy variables with Anadarko as the base category. Generalized
linear model results show that all variables are statistically significant with expected signs. Pipeline
capacity, natural gas and oil futures prices have statistically significant and negative effects on the
duration of the DUC status48. On the other hand, well depth has a positive effect on DUC duration.
Interpretation of the coefficients in the Cox proportional survival model (column B) should be
opposite of the estimated signs (see Teachman and Hayward, 1993 for interpretation of hazard
models). A positive coefficient indicates a negative effect on the probability that a well remains
uncompleted (longer DUC duration). For example, the results show that an increase in natural gas
and oil prices decreases the probability that a well will remain uncompleted at any given time, which
implies a decrease in DUC duration status. On the other hand, the length of the unconventional well
has a positive effect on the duration of DUC status. Similarly, I observe that from 2000 to 2018, the
probability that an unconventional well remains uncompleted at any given time has increased.

48

Pipeline capacity limitations have been especially prominent in the Permian basin leading to negative natural gas prices and increase in the number
of DUCs (Addison, 2018; Surran, 2019).
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The coefficient estimates for the hazard rates (the probability that a well will be completed at
time t given that the well has not been completed prior to t) in column C are consistent with the
estimates from the linear regression model results (column A) and prior expectations.

Variables
Dep-DUC Duration
LL
LR Chi2(12)
NG Future Price
Oil Future Price
Pipeline Capacity
Gas Well49
Well Measured Depth
Time
Appalachia
Bakken
Eagle Ford
Haynesville
Niobrara
Permian

Table 16: DUC Duration Analysis Results
Generalized linear model Semi-Parametric Cox Proportional Model
A. Coef.
B. Coef.
C. Hazard Ratio
-139760
-1346626
-1401168
20062 (0.00)
20062 (0.00)
-0.041 (0.01)***
0.052 (0.01)***
1.053 (0.01)**
-0.051 (0.01)***
0.118 (0.01)***
1.126 (0.01)***
-0.502 (0.03)***
1.013 (0.05)***
2.753 (0.13)***
0.232 (0.01)***
-0.269 (0.01)***
0.764 (0.01)***
0.498 (0.01)***
-0.350 (0.01)***
0.705 (0.00)***
0.0001(0.00)***
-0.0002(0.00)***
0.999 (0.00)***
1.477 (0.03)***
-1.960 (0.04)***
0.141 (0.01)***
-0.320 (0.03)***
0.651 (0.04)***
1.917 (0.08)***
-0.225 (0.03)***
0.594 (0.05)***
1.811 (0.09)***
0.544 (0.03)***
-1.061 (0.04)***
0.346 (0.02)***
0.621 (0.01)***
-0.869 (0.02)***
0.419 (0.01)***
0.288 (0.01)***
-0.411 (0.01)***
0.663 (0.01)***

Observations
126,048
Number of Completions 126,048

127,627
126,048

127,627
126,048

Note: Significance values 1%***, 5%**, 10%*; Standard errors in brackets; Data from 2000-2018
A hazard ratio coefficient greater (less) than one indicates that a unit increase in the covariate
is associated with an increase (decrease) in the probability that a well will be completed at any given
time t, given that it is still in DUC status at time t-1. For example, using the estimates from column C,
all else constant, a one dollar increase in natural gas price is associated with 5.3% increase in the hazard
rate. Similarly, a unit (103 mmcfd) increase in pipeline capacity is associated with 175% increase in
hazard rate, on average across regions. This result illustrates the significance of pipeline infrastructure

49Gas

well is a dummy variable (with 1=Natural Gas producing well and 0=Oil producing well) that captures production
type as defined by operator. Wells are classified based on their gas/oil ratio (GOR).
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for unconventional well completion decisions. On the other hand, a unit (103 ft) increase in the well
depth of an unconventional well is associated with 0.295% (1-0.705) decrease in hazard rate.
The results also show that both survival and hazard rates differ significantly across regions and
that gas wells are more likely to have lengthier DUC periods than primarily oil producing wells. This
result, in combination with the significance of pipeline capacity, is possibly indicative of more pressing
pipeline bottlenecks in natural gas supply than in oil. I also observe that well depth has a negative
effect on the probability of completion at any given time. These results, in general, suggest that prices,
infrastructure, and geologic variables play important roles in operators’ decisions to complete
unconventional gas wells. This is consistent with the results in recent literature where prices and
geologic factors are reported to be significant determinants of unconventional oil and gas production
decisions (Mason and Roberts, 2018; Kleinberg et al., 2018; Ikonnikova and Gülen, 2015).

3.5 Conclusion
The US natural gas production industry has experienced tremendous growth in the recent
decade due to the developments in unconventional oil and gas extraction technologies. This growth
has affected domestic and international energy markets (Oglend, et al., 2016), electricity generation
sector (Peters and Hertel, 2017; Logan et al., 2013), industrial manufacturing sectors (Arora and
Lieskovsky, 2014) and labor markets (Agerton, et al., 2017). Therefore, it is important to identify key
interdependencies in the natural gas industry for appropriate market analysis and effective policy
formulation. The objective of this study is to explain the observed variability in the US natural gas
output in terms of the drilling rig count, the number of producing wells, and the completion of drilled
unconventional wells. I am particularly interested in the observed growth of the number and duration
of DUCs in recent years, given a significant increase in unconventional production.
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I find that since the expansion in shale gas production, the explanatory power of rig count has
declined, while the effect of the number of producing wells remained statistically significant.
Therefore, new wells and completion of drilled wells are important determinants of natural gas output.
The decline in the significance of rig counts as a determinant is expected given the nature of UOG
production technology, where extraction requires hydraulic fracturing as an additional step, which can
be delayed indefinitely. Hence, unless delays in well completion are constant across wells, the
explanatory power of rig counts is expected to decline. Indeed, I observe heterogeneity in the delay of
well completions and an overall increase in the number of DUCs. As a result, the statistical significance
of rig counts has diminished as completion decisions have become important determinants of natural
gas output.
The results show that rig count and futures prices have statistically significant effects on the
number of DUCs. Aggregate, as well as region-specific results indicate that an increase in the natural
gas futures prices decreases the number of DUCs. This suggests that all else constant, increase in
natural gas prices motivates operators to complete existing drilled wells sooner. An increase in the
price of natural gas futures decreases the probability that a well remains uncompleted and increases
the probability that a well will be completed assuming it has not yet been completed. This result is
consistent with producers hedging gas production to take advantage of high initial well productivity.
Forward contracts and futures markets with favorable prices enable producers to pay off well
completion costs faster and attract needed investment to finance well completion.
The duration model also shows that pipeline capacity has a negative effect on the duration of
DUC status. This result confirms the effect of pipeline infrastructure bottlenecks in natural gas
markets. While the effect of pipeline bottlenecks on natural gas prices has been recognized (Oliver et
al., 2014), I show that pipeline capacity has a direct positive effect on the completion of drilled
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unconventional wells using data from multiple shale regions. the results are consistent with the
observed negative effects of pipeline constrains on completion rates and associated negative impacts
on the demand for sand, water, and fracking fleet capacity as reported in industry outlets (Davis, 2018;
Andrien, 2016).
It is important to note that this study does not explicitly address the simultaneity of output,
inventories, and prices. This study is the first to draw attention to the role of well completion in
unconventional gas production as a factor in aggregate output. the objectives for the models of
aggregate natural gas production is to point to the diminished power of rig counts and the increased
role of completion decisions. I refrain from also addressing the identification issues and from claiming
causal inference involving aggregate natural gas supply and prices. Future studies should examine
supply of natural gas considering endogeneity of prices and inventory to support a proper causal
inference for supply. In the analysis of DUC duration, I include prices as one of the factors affecting
the timing of well completion decisions. In the well level analysis, causal inferences pertaining to prices
and well level completion decisions are not as susceptible to the inconsistency of estimates that may
be caused by price endogeneity. For individual well completion modeling, price can be reasonably
treated as an exogenous factor.
The results of this study are important for natural gas operators, energy market analysts,
government agencies and other stakeholders in the natural gas industry. Investors, operators, market
analysts and policy makers rely on natural gas production information to support investment
strategies, facilitate production decisions, improve market analysis, and formulate regulatory policies.
Thus, it is important to have access to the best available information about the primary determinants
of natural gas production. EIA produces a monthly report (Drilling Productivity Report) which uses
data on drilling rig counts, drilling productivity and production in natural gas wells to develop regional
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forecasts of natural gas production. In this study, I show that the information about drilled but
uncompleted wells can be meaningful for improving such projections.
I also show that infrastructure constraints, like pipeline bottlenecks, can have important
implications for well completion decisions and natural gas output in the US. The implications of such
bottlenecks are important for coordinating increasingly interdependent electricity and natural gas
markets (Mugabe et al., 2020) considering reliability (Moeller, 2012; US Department of Energy, 2015).
Increased availability of shale gas has transformed the US power sector (Mugabe et al., 2020; Kerr,
2010; Rogers, 2011), and future developments in natural gas distribution infrastructure will likely have
further implications for US power generation sector (Logan et al., 2013). Future analysis should
examine how the US electricity sector will evolve under various natural gas distribution infrastructure
bottleneck scenarios.
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APPENDIX
Table 3.A1: Split Sample Regional Fixed Effects Results for Aggregate NGP
Dependent – NGP
Before Break(i)
After Break(i)
Rig Countt-1
0.461 (0.02)***
-0.080 (0.02)***
Constant
12.47 (0.12)***
15.97 (0.07)***
R-sq
0.45
0.05
Observations
n=7, N=444
n=7, N=522
Note: Significance values 1%***, 5%**, 10%*; Standard errors in brackets
Table 3.A2: Region and Time Fixed Effects Results for Aggregate NGP
NGP-Dep
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Rig Countt-1
0.298 (0.03)***
0.247 (0.03)***
Producing Wells
0.512 (0.04)***
0.467 (0.04)***
Break(i)
0.427 (0.05)***
0.423 (0.05)***
0.378 (0.05)***
Constant
13.10 (0.22)***
10.01 (0.40)***
9.266 (0.40)***
R-sq
0.61
0.64
0.66
Observations
Balanced Panel n=7, T=138, N=966
Note: Significance values 1%***, 5%**, 10%*; Standard errors in brackets; Data from 2007-2018
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Table 3.A3: Regional Regression Results (Determinants of NGP)
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3

Region
Anadarko
Rig Countt-1
-0.084 (0.02)***
-0.020 (0.02)
Producing Wells
0.510 (0.08)***
0.484 (0.09)***
B1 May 2010
0.259 (0.03)***
0.084 (0.03)***
0.097 (0.03)***
Adj R-sq
0.543
0.618
0.614
Appalachia
Rig Countt-1
0.421 (0.10)***
0.180 (0.09)*
Producing Wells
2.114 (0.30)***
1.902 (0.30)***
B2 August 2012
1.972 (0.08)***
1.501 (0.09)***
1.551 (0.09)***
Adj R-sq
0.831
0.871
0.871
Bakken
Rig Countt-1
0.121 (0.05)**
-0.060 (0.02)***
Producing Wells
0.676 (0.02)***
0.711 (0.02)***
B3 December 2012
1.597 (0.15)***
0.377 (0.05)***
0.311 (0.05)***
Adj R-sq
0.814
0.974
0.976
Eagle Ford
Rig Countt-1
0.238 (0.03)**
0.147 (0.02)***
Producing Wells
1.072 (0.06)***
0.921 (0.06)***
B4 February 2013
1.044 (0.04)***
0.292 (0.06)***
0.381 (0.04)***
Adj R-sq
0.873
0.933
0.958
Haynesville
Rig Countt-1
0.077 (0.02)***
0.160 (0.03)***
Producing Wells
0.177 (0.14)
0.771 (0.17)***
B5 February 2009
0.653 (0.05)***
0.490 (0.08)***
0.391 (0.07)***
Adj R-sq
0.587
0.571
0.638
Niobrara
Rig Countt-1
-0.046 (0.01)***
-0.034 (0.01)***
Producing Wells
0.184 (0.02)***
0.161 (0.02)***
B6 January 2014
-0.015 (0.01)
-0.066 (0.02)***
-0.077 (0.02)***
Adj R-sq
0.061
0.284
0.283
Permian
Rig Countt-1
-0.019 (0.03)
-0.011 (0.03)
Producing Wells
-0.073 (0.07)
-0.065 (0.08)
B7 January 2014
0.462 (0.02)***
0.484 (0.04)***
0.481 (0.03)***
Adj R-sq
0.750
0.752
0.749
Note: Significance values 1%***, 5%**, 10%*; Standard Errors in Brackets; Data from 2007-2018
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Table 3.A4: Region and Time Fixed Effects Results (NGP and New Wells)
Dependent – ΔNGP
Log-log form
Legacy Wells
-0.012 (0.00)***
New Wells
0.009 (0.00)***
Break(i)
0.002 (0.02)
Constant
0.072 (0.03)**
R-sq
0.26
Note: Significance values 1%***, 5%**, 10%*; Standard errors in brackets

Variables
ΔNG Production
ΔRig Count
ΔNG Futures price
ΔOil Futures prices
ΔRig Count
ΔNG Production
ΔProducing Wells
ΔRig Count
ΔNG Production
ΔProducing Wells
ΔRig Count
ΔNG Production
ΔProducing Wells
ΔRig Count
ΔNG Production
ΔProducing Wells
ΔRig Count
ΔNG Production
ΔProducing Wells
ΔRig Count
ΔNG Production
ΔProducing Wells
ΔRig Count
ΔNG Production
ΔProducing Wells

Table 3.A5: Unit Root Tests
With trend
Without trend
With trend
Without trend
Phillips-Perron
Augmented Dickey-Fuller
Regional Aggregate
-50.060***
-48.412***
-35.003***
-34.928***
-5.636***
-5.629***
-5.087***
-5.085***
-12.862***
-12.866***
-12.903***
-12.903***
-5.621***
-5.617***
-7.071***
-7.094***
Levin-Lin-Chu
Augmented Dickey-Fuller
Anadarko
-4.987***
-4.985***
-4.912***
-4.929***
-12.601***
-12.451***
-12.412***
-12.311***
96.47
63.152
-18.883***
-18.164***
Appalachia
-5.702***
-5.585***
-5.617***
-5.522***
-8.416***
-7.270***
-8.290***
-7.188***
-14.339***
-12.918***
-19.903***
-19.919***
Bakken
-4.820***
-4.679***
-4.747***
-4.626***
-10.783***
-10.031***
-10.620***
-9.918***
157.528
126.49
2.733
2.262
Eagle Ford
-4.860***
-4.758***
-4.786***
-4.705***
-5.759***
-5.758***
-5.672***
-5.693***
3.407
1.672
-9.951***
-9.76***
Haynesville
-4.813***
-4.800***
-4.741***
-4.746***
-4.571***
-4.565***
-4.502***
-4.514***
-17.226***
-6.157***
-9.597***
-8.984***
Niobrara
-5.781***
-5.776***
-5.694***
-5.711***
-8.550***
-8.428***
-8.421***
-8.333***
30.459
23.813
-21.602***
-20.942***
Permian
-4.185***
-4.182***
-4.122**
-4.135***
-9.870***
-8.215***
-9.721***
-8.122***
-9.036***
-7.827***
-17.335***
-16.921***
Note: Significance levels ***1%; **5%; *10%
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Series→
Region
Anadarko
Appalachia
Bakken
Eagle Ford
Haynesville
Niobrara
Permian

Table 3.A6: Variable Lag Length
NGP & RC
NGP & PW
#of lags
#of lags
#of lags
#of lags
(AIC)
(HQIC)
(AIC)
(HQIC)
4 (-7.13)
3 (-6.99)
4 (-7.79)
4 (-7.61)
3 (-7.14)
2 (-7.02)
4 (-5.87)
1 (-5.75)
3 (-6.57)
2 (-6.45)
1 (-4.00)
1 (-3.93)
2 (-7.14)
2 (-7.03)
4 (-9.20)
4 (-9.03)
2 (-7.22)
2 (-7.12)
4 (-10.03) 4 (-9.85)
2 (-7.69)
2 (-7.58)
2 (-7.90)
2 (-7.79)
2 (-7.30)
2 (-7.19)
2 (-7.80)
2 (-7.69)
AIC/HQIC level in parenthesis

NGP, RC & PW
#of lags
#of lags
(AIC)
(HQIC)
4 (-10.70)
3(-10.36)
2 (-8.94)
2(-8.75)
3(-6.76)
2(-6.57)
4 (-11.54)
4 (-11.20)
3 (-12.29)
3 (-12.03)
2 (-10.26)
2 (-10.07)
2 (-10.85)
2 (-10.66)

Table 3.A7: Pedroni Panel Test for Cointegration
Test Statistic
Panel Statistics
Group Statistics
V
-1.782 (1.93)
.
Rho
-7.322 (2.00)
-17.73 (2.00)
PP
-3.066 (2.00)
-5.013 (2.00)
Adf
2.084 (0.04)**
2.084 (0.01)***
Note: P-values in parenthesis; Significance levels ***1%; **5%; *10%
Table 3.A8: Johansen Test for Cointegration
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
NGP & RC NGP & PW
NGP, RC & PW
Region
Rank
Rank
Rank
Anadarko
0 (6.97)*
0 (13.44)*
2 (0.59)*
Appalachia
1 (2.76)*
1 (2.15)*
2 (3.22)*
Bakken
1 (1.66)*
0 (10.12)*
1 (11.99)*
Eagle Ford
1 (2.31)*
0 (10.33)*
1 (6.23)*
Haynesville
1 (3.57)*
0 (13.98)*
1 (12.82)*
Niobrara
0 (14.47)*
1 (1.17)*
0 (22.86)*
Permian
1 (3.25)*
1 (0.01)*
1 (6.24)*
Trace statistic level in parenthesis
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Table 3.A9: Region Panel Vector Autoregressive (PVAR) Model Results
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
ΔNatural Gas Production
LD
-0.012 (0.04)
-0.013 (0.04)
-0.021 (0.04)
-0.038 (0.04)
L2D
0.067 (0.04)
0.072 (0.04)*
0.063 (0.04)
L3D
0.150 (0.04)***
0.157 (0.04)***
L4D
0.114 (0.04)***
ΔRig Count
LD
0.002 (0.01)
-0.010 (0.02)
-0.009 (0.02)
-0.009 (0.02)
L2D
0.021 (0.02)
0.015 (0.02)
0.014 (0.02)
L3D
0.010 (0.01)
-0.011 (0.01)
0.025 (0.01)**
ΔProducing Wells
LD
0.036 (0.02)**
0.040 (0.02)**
0.034 (0.02)
0.027 (0.02)
L2D
0.006 (0.02)
0.010 (0.02)
-0.003 (0.03)
L3D
0.005 (0.02)
-0.001 (0.02)
-0.003 (0.01)
Note: Significance values 1%***, 5%**, 10%*; Standard errors in brackets
Table 3.A10: Regional Vector Error Correction (VEC) Model Results
Variables
Anadarko
Appalachia
Bakken
Eagle Ford Haynesville Niobrara
Error
-1.730***
0.005
-0.779***
-0.365***
-0.140**
-0.648***
Correction (0.24)
(0.01)
(0.18)
(0.09)
(0.06)
(0.15)
ΔNatural Gas Production
LD
0.411***
-0.979***
-0.137
-0.471***
-0.588***
-0.490***
(0.20)
(0.09)
(0.16)
(0.10)
(0.09)
(0.14)
L2D
0.051
-0.570***
-0.146
-0.380***
-0.455***
-0.354***
(0.14)
(0.12)
(0.13)
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.12)
L3D
-0.013
-0.176
-0.010
-0.194**
-0.158
-0.143
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.08)
(0.09)
(0.08)
ΔRig Count
LD
0.064
0.005
-0.098
-0.100***
-0.027
-0.053**
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.03)
L2D
-0.022
0.079
-0.156***
-0.037
-0.005
-0.016
(0.04)
(0.06)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.03)
L3D
-0.078
0.048
-0.057
-0.010
-0.023
-0.022
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.02)
ΔProducing Wells
LD
0.606***
-0.056
-0.026
-0.647***
0.076
-0.330***
(0.11)
(0.09)
(0.66)
(0.20)
(0.18)
(0.08)
L2D
0.407
-0.035
0.244
0.372
-0.510
-0.246**
(0.86)
(0.06)
(0.70)
(0.38)
(0.38)
(0.12)
L3D
1.622
-0.011
0.037
-0.129
-0.949
-0.127
(0.86)
(0.03)
(0.65)
(0.63)
(1.04)
(0.10)
R-sq
0.70
0.57
0.49
0.46
0.38
0.59
Note: Significance values 1%***, 5%**, 10%*; Standard errors in brackets

Permian
-0.799***
(0.17)
-0.364**
(0.16)
-0.227
(0.14)
-0.043
(0.09)
-0.114**
(0.05)
-0.008
(0.05)
-0.013
(0.05)
0.840***
(0.16)
0.565***
(0.12)
0.223***
(0.07)
0.65

